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Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation:  
Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies 
 
Lawrence A. Hamermesh and Michael L. Wachter1 
Abstract 
 This article examines the evolution of Delaware appraisal litigation and concludes that 
recent precedents have created a satisfactory framework in which the remedy is most effective in 
the case of transactions where there is the greatest reason to question the efficacy of the market 
for corporate control, and vice versa. We suggest that, in effect, the developing framework 
invites the courts to accept the deal price as the proper measure of fair value, not because of any 
presumption that would operate in the absence of proof, but where the proponent of the 
transaction affirmatively demonstrates that the transaction would survive judicial review under 
the enhanced scrutiny standard applicable to fiduciary duty-based challenges to sales of 
corporate control. We also suggest, however, that the courts and expert witnesses should and are 
likely to refine the manner in which elements of value (synergies) should, as a matter of well-
established law, be deducted from the deal price to arrive at an appropriate estimate of fair 
value. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 Facilitated largely by “appraisal arbitrage” – the practice of purchasing shares of stock 
after announcement of a merger, with a view to exercising the statutory right to an award of “fair 
value” in lieu of the merger price – the once-discredited appraisal remedy has become a 
significant phenomenon in shareholder litigation.2 That development has generated competing 
claims that appraisal arbitrage should be prohibited because it unduly deters bids, or should be 
                                                
1 Lawrence A. Hamermesh is Professor Emeritus at Widener University Delaware Law School 
and Executive Director of the Institute for Law and Economics at the University of 
Pennsylvania. Michael L. Wachter is the William B. Johnson Professor of Law and Economics, 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Co-Director of the Institute for Law and Economics 
at the University of Pennsylvania. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of 
Albert Garner, Henry Hu, Jennifer Muller, Edward Rock, Roberta Romano, William Savitt, 
Matthew Schoenfeld, Holger Spamann, Robert Thompson, and the other participants in the fall 
2017 Corporate Law Roundtable at the Institute for Law and Economics. The authors are also 
grateful for the research assistance of Ben Bertan, Adriane Sanchez, Spencer Nord and Scarlett 
Ying. 
2 See Part II.A below. 
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encouraged as an incentive to bidders to pay fair value.3 Increased use of the appraisal remedy 
has also engendered a parallel debate about the role of the merger price in determining fair value: 
one school of thought posits that the merger price (or deal price) should presumptively be taken 
to reflect fair value; the opposing school holds that such a “market price rule” harms target 
company stockholders and should be rejected.4 
 We submit that the Delaware courts are developing a middle ground point of view with 
respect to these parallel debates. On one hand, the courts have continued to affirm that the 
practice of appraisal arbitrage is legally permissible under the governing statutory framework, 
and the Delaware legislature has done nothing to undermine that view.5 On the other hand, the 
courts’ increasing reliance on the deal price to measure fair value has undoubtedly circumscribed 
the incentive to engage in appraisal arbitrage, at least in cases in which such reliance is most 
likely to occur.6 
 We support this middle ground point of view, and suggest two significant refinements 
that would clarify the operation of the appraisal remedy. First, we suggest that the Delaware 
courts’ treatment of the use of the deal price to determine fair value does and should mirror the 
treatment of shareholder class action fiduciary duty litigation. In the case of a sale of corporate 
control, in which the Delaware statute affords appraisal rights,7 the governing standard of 
judicial review requires “enhanced scrutiny” to determine the reasonableness of the sale 
process.8 That same form of judicial review could usefully be applied to determine when the deal 
                                                
3 See Part II.B below. 
4 See Part III.B.2.a below 
5 See  Part II.A below. 
6 See Part III.B.1.c below. 
7 Tit. 8, DEL. CODE ANN., § 262 (“Section 262”). 
8 E.g., QVC Network v. Paramount Communications, 635 A.2d 1245, 1268 n. 44 (Del. 1993) 
(“The enhanced scrutiny required by Revlon [Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
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price should be used to measure fair value: where the proponents of the deal satisfy that form of 
review, such use of the deal price is appropriate; and where they don’t, it’s not.9  
 Second, we further suggest that reliance on the deal price, without further inquiry, 
inappropriately creates a no-lose proposition for appraisal arbitrage.10 It also fails to give effect 
to well-settled judicial interpretation of the appraisal statute, under which elements of value 
reflected in the deal price must be deducted to arrive at fair value if they involve value 
(synergies) that can be achieved only as a result of the merger.11 Case law and finance literature 
are sparse, however, in their treatment and quantification of an appropriate deduction for 
synergies, and we suggest that refinement of that treatment is likely, as deal price comes to play 
a more regular role in the establishment of fair value. 
 We develop the foregoing suggestions in the following manner. In Part II, we describe 
the growth of appraisal arbitrage and the use of the appraisal remedy, and we briefly recount and 
comment on the debate about the utility of appraisal arbitrage. In Part III, we begin with 
consideration of a possible statutory change to address concerns about appraisal arbitrage, but 
find that approach impractical and unlikely to occur. We then consider an approach involving 
refinement of the standards for determining fair value in appraisal litigation. In that regard, we 
                                                                                                                                                       
A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)] imposes upon the directors the burden of showing the reasonableness of 
their conduct.”). 
9 Where the proponent of the transaction fails to establish the reasonableness of the sale process, 
it may still be appropriate for the court to take the deal price into account in some manner, such 
as a corroborative check on the results of other valuation techniques. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of 
Dell, Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, *148 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016), rev’d sub nom. Dell, Inc. v. 
Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., [2017 Del. LEXIS 518,] _ A.3d __ (Del. 
2017) (“The market data is sufficient to exclude the possibility, advocated by the petitioners' 
expert, that the Merger undervalued the Company by $23 billion”). 
10 “No-lose” is admittedly a loose characterization: legal and expert witness fees must usually be 
borne by dissenting stockholders, and may or may not exceed the benefit of relatively high pre-
judgment interest on what is essentially an intermediate duration debt claim against the 
corporation surviving the merger. See text at notes [170-171] below. 
11 See Part IV.A below. 
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review the evolution of the role of deal price and the parallel evolution of the use of discounted 
cash flow (DCF) analysis in appraisal litigation. We then briefly outline the academic debate 
about the relative merits of these two valuation approaches, including the debate about the 
possibility of a “market price rule” in which deal price is presumptively determinative of fair 
value. We conclude Part III with an assessment of the standards by which the courts do and 
should take deal price into account in determining fair value. 
 In Part IV, we review how the courts in appraisal litigation have addressed the treatment 
of synergistic elements of value in the deal price. Acknowledging the legal proposition that such 
elements must be excluded in determining fair value, we next review how such elements ought to 
be identified. At that point, we review possible approaches for determining the extent of such 
synergistic gains, and for determining how such gains might be allocated between acquirers and 
target company stockholders. We conclude Part IV with the observation that these approaches to 
synergies are not fully developed in the case law or finance literature, and suggest that law and 
finance practitioners and the Delaware courts are likely to devote increased attention to refining 
those approaches. 
 
II. APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE: HISTORY AND CRITIQUES 
 A. The Legal Framework for, and Growth of, Appraisal Arbitrage 
 Although the Delaware appraisal statute is not altogether explicit on the point, it has long 
been recognized that someone who buys shares after the announcement of the terms of a merger 
is nonetheless entitled to seek appraisal with respect to those shares – i.e., engage in “appraisal 
arbitrage” – as long as the person complies with the formal requirements of the appraisal 
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statute.12 Although this recognition is frequently traced back to the Transkaryotic opinion in 
2007, the Delaware Court of Chancery first acknowledged the right of post-announcement 
purchasers to seek appraisal nearly twenty years earlier.13 
 The practice of engaging in appraisal arbitrage did not emerge on a large scale, however, 
until after 2007, but when it did, the previously inhospitable and relatively rarely used appraisal 
remedy became a hot litigation commodity: as vividly illustrated by a bar graph presented by 
Subramanian, “appraisal has gone from a trickle in 2009 to approximately $2.0 billion in face 
value of claims in each of 2015 and 2016.”14 Much of this growth has been driven by specialized 
players in the appraisal arbitrage field, one of whom (Merion Capital) by itself accounted for 
36% of the face value of all appraisal claims during the measurement period (2009-2016).15  
 B. The Appraisal Arbitrage Debate 
  The phenomenon of appraisal arbitrage has generated considerable controversy, which 
we review here only briefly. Some of the criticism of the practice takes an almost morals-based 
tone. Early on, it was argued that the practice was inequitable, much like the purchase of stock to 
                                                
12 In re Appraisal of Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 (Del. Ch. May 2, 
2007). 
13 Salomon Bros., Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 576 A.2d 650 (Del. Ch. 1989); cf. Guhan 
Subramanian, Using Deal Price to Determine “Fair Value” in Appraisal Proceedings, at 2, 
available at http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/20170206_Subramanian-
draft_9aa5b475-ed61-4fae-8b39-9b2de9d09425_78008941-390f-458a-a0e0-92863f300dc8.pdf 
(Transkaryotic “opened the way for appraisal arbitrage”). One of the authors represented 
Salomon Brothers in this case. Transkaryotic addressed and rejected one argument not raised in 
Interstate Bakeries, namely the claim that a post-announcement purchaser should be required to 
demonstrate that its shares, held in fungible bulk in the name of a depository nominee, were not 
voted in favor of the merger. 
14 Subramanian, note [ ] above, at 2. 
15 Id. at 10. 
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bring a derivative suit based on a preexisting wrong to the corporation.16 According to seven 
highly respected corporate law firms, the practice of appraisal arbitrage is downright 
“unseemly.”17 Conversely, criticism of appraisal arbitrage invokes the claim – consistently 
rejected by the Delaware courts – that appraisal rights were intended only for the benefit of pre-
announcement holders, and should not be construed to extend to post-announcement 
purchasers.18 In response to these legal or moral arguments, supporters of appraisal arbitrage 
argue that purchasing shares after the deal is announced, in order to exercise appraisal rights, is 
no more unseemly or inequitable than widely accepted practices of trading other financial or 
contractual claims.19 Those supporters have consistently won the formal legal argument, with the 
                                                
16 Salomon Brothers, 576 A.2d at 653-654 (respondent “contends that Salomon's position is the 
same as that of a stockholder who attempts to bring a derivative suit complaining of wrongs that 
pre-date the stockholder's first purchase of stock.”). 
17 Letter to the Council of the Delaware State Bar Association Corporation Law Section, from 
Cravath Swaine & Moore LLP, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, Latham & Watkins LLP, Skadden 
Arps Slate Meagher & Flom LLP, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, 
and Wachtell Lipton Rosen & Katz, Apr. 1, 2015, available at [] (denying appraisal rights to 
post-announcement purchasers “would … reduce the unseemly claims-buying that is rampant 
and serves no legitimate equitable or other purpose, but threatens to undermine transactional 
certainty and reduce value to shareholders of Delaware corporations as acquirers, particularly in 
leveraged transactions, may be forced to factor the enhanced appraisal risk into their 
calculations."). 
18 Richard A. Booth, The Real Problem With Appraisal Arbitrage, 72 BUS. LAW. 325 (2017) 
(“the appraisal remedy is widely seen as intended to protect existing stockholders who are (or 
will be) forced to sell their shares in the merger”); Salomon Brothers, 576 A.2d at 651-652 
(“IBC's primary argument is that the appraisal statute was not designed to protect those who wish 
to speculate on a judicial remedy and that Salomon acted in bad faith by purchasing shares with 
notice of the merger and then demanding appraisal. … Th[e] history of our appraisal statute does 
not support IBC's argument that the statute was designed to protect only those stockholders who 
purchased their shares prior to the announcement of a merger. Rather, its purpose was to replace 
the stockholder's veto power with a means of withdrawing from the company at a judicially 
determined price.”). 
19 Council of the Corporation Law Section of the Delaware State Bar Association, Explanatory 
Paper (Mar. 16, 2015), at 2, available at 
https://www.lowenstein.com/files/upload/DGCL%20262%20Proposal%203-6-
15%20Explanatory%20Paper.pdf (“The assignment and acquisition of financial claims (in 
contrast to tort claims) generally has been accepted historically and presently as lawful and 
2/26/18  
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courts holding that the words and history of the appraisal statute support the practice of appraisal 
arbitrage.20 In sum, we see no basis in existing statutes or precedent to conclude that appraisal 
arbitrage offends some well-established moral or legal precept. 
 Other criticisms of appraisal arbitrage rely more on economic analysis. It has been 
suggested, for example, that appraisal arbitrageurs unfairly benefit from a “free option” to take 
advantage of information arising after the announcement of the deal.21 Critics also contend that 
                                                                                                                                                       
consistent with public policy.”), citing 6 Del. C. § 2702 (assignees of bonds, specialties and notes 
may enforce in their own name); 10 Del. C. § 3902 (assignees of contracts may enforce in their 
own name); Lauren D. Gojkovich, Leveraging Litigation: How Shareholders Can Use Litigation 
Leverage to Double Down on Their Investment in High Stakes Securities Litigation, 16 STAN. 
L.J. BUS. & FIN.100, 111 (2010). See also Eric Winston, Understanding The Reasons Traders 
Buy Bankruptcy Claims, Law 360 (Jan. 8, 2014), available at 
https://www.law360.com/articles/498711/understanding-the-reasons-traders-buy-bankruptcy-
claims (“it is common in ‘mega’ Chapter 11 cases to see on the docket hundreds, if not 
thousands, of ‘claims transfer notices’ filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
3001(e), and that is only a small set of the claims trading activity.”). 
20 Salomon Brothers, 576 A.2d at 652 (“If appraisal rights were granted as the quid pro quo for 
the loss of veto power, there is no apparent reason why all stockholders who formerly could have 
exercised that veto power should not now be able to exercise appraisal rights”); Transkaryotic, 
2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57 at *10-11 (“Must a beneficial shareholder, who purchased 
shares after the record date but before the merger vote, prove, by documentation, that each newly 
acquired share (i.e., after the record date) is a share not voted in favor of the merger by 
the previous beneficial shareholder? The answer seems simple. No. Under the literal terms of the 
statutory text and under longstanding Delaware Supreme Court precedent, only a record holder, 
as defined in the DGCL, may claim and perfect appraisal rights. Thus, it necessarily follows that 
the record holder's actions determine perfection of the right to seek appraisal.”). 
21 Gaurav Jetley & Xinyu Ji, Appraisal Arbitrage—Is There a Delaware Advantage?, 71 BUS. 
LAW. 427, 433-441 (2016); Trevor S. Norwitz, Delaware Legislature Should Act to Curb 
Appraisal Arbitrage Abuses, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 10, 2015), available at 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/02/10/delaware-legislature-should-act-to-curb-
appraisal-arbitrage-abuses/ (“the fact that the relevant appraisal valuation date is the closing of a 
transaction, rather than the time of announcement of the deal or the shareholder vote … gives the 
appraisal arbitrageur a free option on positive developments between signing and closing.”); New 
Activist Weapon – The Rise of Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage: A Survey of Cases and Some 
Practical Implications, FRIED FRANK: M&A BRIEFING (Jun. 18, 2014), at 2, available at 
http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/FINAL%20-
%206182014%20TOC%20Memo%20-%20New%20Activist%20Weapon--
%20The%20Rise%20of%20Delaware%20Appraisal%20Arbitrage.pdf (“With this timing 
advantage, investors can review information in the company’s proxy statement relating to its sale 
2/26/18  
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appraisal arbitrage creates a post-closing risk for buyers that will result in reduced deal prices, as 
bidders hold back a reserve to deal with post-closing appraisal claims of uncertain magnitude.22 
It has also been suggested that appraisal arbitrageurs, as the beneficiaries of appraisal awards, 
divert value to themselves from the pre-existing holders from whom they purchase shares.23 We 
are at best skeptical of these claims, however. The “free option” described by critics is unlikely 
to have any substantial value in all but the most unusual case, and is not likely to have provided 
the incentive for appraisal arbitrage.24 Likewise, the claim that appraisal arbitrage reduces deal 
prices appears to be inconsistent with, or at least unsupported by, empirical research.25 Finally, 
there is at least some empirical support for the assertion that appraisal arbitrage not only solves a 
                                                                                                                                                       
process and fairness of the price, can assess any pre-closing shareholder litigation that has been 
commenced, and can evaluate market, industry and target company conditions at a time much 
closer to the merger closing date (as of which time the court will determine fair value in an 
appraisal proceeding) as compared to the time when the deal price was negotiated and then voted 
on.”) 
22 Norwitz, note [] above (“buyers will just respond to the new wave of appraisal arbitrage with 
lower purchase prices, as they feel the need to hold something back for the likely appraisal 
‘grab’”). 
23 Jay B. Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 92 
(2017) (“Rational acquirers that anticipate appraisal proceedings, even in marginal cases, will 
self-insure against appraisal outlays by offering less for their acquisitions, thereby transferring 
value from target shareholders as a class to the minority who dissent.”). 
24 Booth, note [ ] above, at 328 (“the suggestion that arbs may capture the benefit of new 
information that indicates a higher value for the subject company misconstrues how the appraisal 
remedy works: It is almost impossible for any information revealed after a merger is announced 
to affect fair price as determined by an appraisal court.”). Transkaryotic may be the rare case in 
which that scenario actually occurred. See George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. L. 
REV. 1635, 1638-1639 (2011) (noting that “overwhelmingly positive” test results on a new drug 
arrived after the announcement of the merger but before the merger vote and the closing date). 
25 Audra Boone, et al., Merger Negotiations in the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal, Sep. 30, 2017 
working paper, at 3, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039040 
(“none of our models suggest that bidders lower their offer price in response to heightened threat 
of dissenters asserting appraisal”); cf. Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage 
and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1555 (2015) (“appraisal 
petitioners target transactions with lower deal premia and also going-private transactions, where 
minority shareholders are most likely to face expropriation.”). 
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collective action problem facing disaggregated pre-announcement stockholders in seeking 
appraisal,26 but also results in increased prices for their stock.27  
 On balance, we conclude that appraisal arbitrage is an inapt target for unqualified 
criticism or accolades: it simply makes the appraisal remedy viable in the case of a public 
company merger where potentially dissenting shares are widely dispersed. If appraisal arbitrage 
is a bad thing, it is only because and to the extent that the appraisal remedy is allowed to operate 
in a manner that is inefficient.28 If a viable appraisal remedy creates problems or inefficiencies, 
the debate should be about how to define where that remedy is available and what valuation 
principles should apply. And that definition, we believe, should be shaped in a manner that 
encourages (or at least permits) appraisal arbitrage where the remedy is useful, and discourages 
appraisal arbitrage where it is not useful.  
 Determining whether the appraisal remedy is “useful,” of course, requires an articulation 
of what purpose the remedy should serve. In this regard, we find it hard to improve on what Vice 
Chancellor Sam Glasscock III recently described as “ruminations” about the appraisal remedy:29 
                                                
26 Korsmo & Myers, note [ ] above, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. at 1555-1556 (2015) (“By buying up 
large positions after the announcement of a transaction, arbitrageurs can overcome the collective 
action problems that would otherwise render appraisal ineffective.”). 
27 Boone, et al., at 20-21 (absence of an arbitrage spread in deals targeted by appraisal litigation 
“implies that some of the gains from merger arbitrage … are shared with passive investors.”); see 
also Scott Callahan, et al., Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder Value, (Nov. 9, 2017 working 
paper), at 5, available at [ ] (“deal premia are discernibly higher in appraisal eligible transactions 
(even after controlling for the tax status of the deal).”). 
28 As a member of the Delaware Court of Chancery with considerable experience with appraisal 
litigation has noted, “appraisal arbitrage is no better or worse than the underlying appraisal cause 
of action: whether that action promotes efficiency or not, the effect — good or ill — is simply 
magnified by the availability of arbitrage.” Hon. Sam Glasscock III, Ruminations on Appraisal, 
DEL. LAW. 29 (Summer 2017). 
29 Id. at 8. Much other ink has been spilled in the effort to divine the purpose of the appraisal 
remedy. E.g., Thompson, note [ ] above. 
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• “The reason for appraisal must be sought, I think, in terms of efficient capital markets, 
not fairness.”30 
• Because “few people would invest in equity ownership subject to squeeze-out [by 
controlling stockholders] at an unfair price … [c]reating conditions that encourage 
investment … requires a judicial appraisal, using valuation techniques, in the squeeze-out 
or ‘classic’ appraisal situation.”31 
• In contrast, “I find little to recommend extending an appraisal right to dissenters in the 
case of a ‘clean’ merger”32 – which he defines as one “where the stock is readily 
transferable, approved by a disinterested board independent of any controller or other 
conflict, and where the sale is consummated after an exposure to the market.”33 
• “To believe … [that] efficiency requires appraisal with respect to a clean merger, one 
must also believe a number of subsidiary propositions,” namely that: 
o “[A]n entity has an objective, inherent value” that “is potentially higher than will 
be developed by a sale with market exposure.” 
o “[T]he inherent value of an acquired entity is higher than the stand-alone value of 
the company as determined (presumably erroneously) by its informed fiduciaries, 
who must approve the sale.” 
o “[A] bench judge, armed with self-serving expert testimony from the parties, is a 
more reliable diviner of inherent value than the market and the directors.”34 
                                                
30 Glassock, note [ ] above, at 9. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 10. 
33 Id. at 8. 
34 Id. 
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To this list of prerequisites of the use of appraisal in “clean” mergers, we would add the 
proposition that such “inherent value” exceeds the value approved (presumably erroneously) by a 
majority in interest of the persons (the stockholders) holding the economic interest in the 
enterprise. The Vice Chancellor describes these propositions as “more or less unlikely,”35 and 
concludes that that it is “unlikely that a lack of appraisal rights [in respect of “clean” mergers] 
would dissuade investment.”36  
 
III. REFINING THE APPRAISAL REMEDY TO PROMOTE EFFICIENCY 
 A. A Possible Statutory Solution  
 If that assertion by the Vice Chancellor is correct, and the availability of appraisal rights 
in “clean” mergers carries with it countervailing costs and risks, the most logical reform is 
simply to eliminate appraisal rights in that setting. Indeed, the Model Business Corporation Act 
adopts such an approach in the case of publicly traded stock by eliminating appraisal rights 
unless the merger constitutes an “interested transaction,”37 which it defines (phrased in a 
somewhat oversimplified way) as a merger “involving” a holder of over 20% of the voting stock, 
someone with power to name 25% or more of the board, or, in certain cases, a senior executive 
who is to receive a side benefit in the merger.38 Delaware’s statute, in contrast, makes no 
distinction between interested transactions and “clean” mergers, conferring appraisal rights (or 
not) instead depending on the form of merger consideration.39 Thus, if the goal of appraisal is to 
provide a check against deprivation of value due to conflict of interest, Delaware’s statute is both 
                                                
35 Id. at 10. 
36 Id. at 11. 
37 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2016 Revision) §13.02(b)(4). 
38 Id., §13.01 (defining “interested transaction”). 
39 Section 262(b) (denying appraisal rights for widely held or traded shares, but restoring such 
rights if the merger consideration is cash). 
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overinclusive and underinclusive: it is overinclusive because it provides appraisal rights in a cash 
merger negotiated at arm’s length and approved by a disinterested board of directors and a 
majority of disinterested stockholders; it is underinclusive because it denies appraisal rights in 
the case of a merger unilaterally implemented by a publicly traded controlling stockholder (and 
its nominees on the board of directors) in which the minority stockholders receive shares of the 
controlling stockholder. Despite persistent criticism and suggestions for reform,40 however, 
Delaware’s appraisal statute has remained untouched in terms of its allocation of appraisal rights.  
 And even those who advocate an approach similar to the Model Act acknowledge the 
difficulty of defining an “interested transaction,”41 or any other predictable dividing line between 
mergers in which appraisal is a valuable check on market imperfection and mergers in which the 
market can be trusted to provide a reasonable assurance that the transaction is delivering fair 
value. Should appraisal rights be excluded in a merger approved by directors, even if all 
disinterested, whose approval was the result of gross negligence? Where even disinterested 
directors approve a deal based on a pre-signing market check was demonstrably deficient in 
identifying likely bidders, and the merger was shored up by unusually strong deal protections? 
                                                
40 Most recently, senior Delaware practitioner David McBride has urged that appraisal rights for 
public company shares be limited to “interested transactions,” which “would be defined to 
capture those situations in which the officers, directors or a majority of the stockholders have an 
interest that conflicts with that of the dissenting stockholders.” 
David C. McBride, Rebalancing the Merger Litigation Landscape, DEL. LAW. 24, 25-26 
(Summer 2017). Previous critiques of the Delaware statute’s allocation of appraisal rights 
include Randall S. Thomas, Revising the Delaware Appraisal Statute, 3 DEL. L. REV. 1, 16-21 
(2000), and Robert B. Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in 
Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 53-54 (1995). 
41 McBride, note [ ] above, at 26 (“The major disadvantage of this approach is the difficulty of 
statutorily defining ‘interested transactions.’ What conflicts and whose conflicts justify providing 
a valuation remedy?”). The Model Act provision itself suffers from an ambiguity in restoring 
appraisal rights where the transaction is one “involving an interested person.” §13.01. The 
Official Comment explains only that “involving” “denotes participation beyond merely voting or 
participating on the same basis as other holders of securities of the same or a similar class or 
series.” 
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Attempting to account for such situations through a statutory allocation of appraisal rights could 
bedevil statutory drafters for years to come. 
 B. An Alternative Approach Involving Judicial Valuation 
 The other avenue for limiting appraisal to where it can be most useful involves tailoring 
the principles for determining fair value in appraisal litigation. That avenue, which is the one we 
advocate, would employ an approach to determining fair value that: (1) promotes appraisal (and 
appraisal arbitrage) in cases where it represents a genuine check on a process for determining the 
merger price that lacks assurance that the price is fair – most obviously, where the price is 
proposed and imposed unilaterally by a controlling stockholder – and (2) discourages appraisal 
where the process for determining the merger price provides assurance that the price is fair. 
Refining judicial valuation approaches could obviate the need to engage in the development of a 
bright line, predictably applied statutory rule for determining whether appraisal rights exist. If 
those valuation approaches discourage the exercise of appraisal rights where the sale process is 
robust, the extension of appraisal rights to mergers not warranting significant judicial scrutiny is 
a problem more theoretical than real.42 
 With that proposition in mind, we turn to an examination of the development of the 
approach to appraisal that we advocate and, in fact, we have seen evolving in the Delaware cases 
in the last few years. 
  1. Judicial Valuation History  
   a. Defining “Fair Value” and Reliance on DCF Analysis 
 The use of deal price (or third party sale value) to determine fair value in appraisal 
proceedings has undergone a striking evolution over the last 40 years or so. Early in that time 
                                                
42 The authors acknowledge Stanley Keller as the source of this observation. 
2/26/18  
 14 
frame, it was petitioning stockholders who argued for use of the deal price, or the value of the 
company in a hypothetical sale or dissolution.43 And it was appraisal defendants who resisted use 
of the deal price, on the theory that shareholders have no right in appraisal litigation to receive 
the value that was or could have been received in a third-party sale.44 The defendants’ arguments 
rested on both statute and case law: use of the deal price (or hypothetical third party sale value) 
would include elements of value (synergies) attributable to the accomplishment or expectation of 
the merger (or hypothetical merger), in violation of Section 262(h), and the case law’s reference 
to fair value as a proportionate share of the value of the going concern precluded inclusion of 
value attributable to the value of control reflected in the deal price. 
 Interestingly, the Delaware courts managed to sidestep this controversy, mostly because 
they increasingly turned to discounted cash flow valuation techniques to determine fair value. As 
we have written, a valuation aimed at yielding the present value of future free cash flows of the 
subject firm is, at least theoretically, consistent with the case law definition of fair value as the 
value of the going concern.45 By focusing solely on anticipated returns to the corporation itself, 
that valuation approach conveniently, and appropriately, enables the courts to avoid applying 
discounts of various sorts attributable to the nature or status of the dissenting shares (e.g., a 
minority discount or a discount for lack of marketability), or premiums attributable to synergistic 
merger gains or gains achievable through consolidation of control.  
 As the courts became more comfortable with DCF analysis, however, something 
interesting happened. Contrary to the tenor of the debate in the 1970s and 1980s, when 
                                                
43 Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware 
Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119, 155 (2005) (“Cornfields”), discussing Bell v. Kirby Lumber 
Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). 
44 Id. at 154 n. 140. 
45 Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in 
Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (2009). 
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petitioners argued for deal price and respondents argued for less, courts applying DCF analysis 
increasingly arrived at valuations greater than the deal price. In some cases, this was not at all 
surprising: for example, where the deal price is established unilaterally in a freezeout by a 
controlling stockholder and, accordingly, the market for corporate control does not afford any 
corroboration of the deal price as fair value, a responsible DCF analysis may well result in a fair 
value in excess of the deal price. But, as it turned out, that sort of case was by no means the only 
circumstance in which a DCF-based fair value was found to exceed deal price. Increasingly, this 
outcome was observed in cases in which the court entertained some doubt about the efficacy of 
even a conflict-free sale process. 
 In 2004, for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery used DCF analysis to award an 
amount greater than the sale price of the company.46 In so doing, the court directly confronted 
and rejected the respondent’s claim that the merger price was at least as great as fair value 
because it was the product of “a ‘thorough and fair’ auction.”47 To the contrary, the court found 
that after the founder/director/1% stockholder of the firm made a bid, the subsequent sale process 
“likely did not include all potential bidders, was conducted quite hastily, and probably reduced 
the likelihood that all bidders would be fully apprised of the Company's current prospects.”48 The 
resulting fair value determination was $1.64 per share, about 60% higher than the $1.06 per share 
deal price. 
 In that same year (2004), the Court of Chancery similarly disposed of another appraisal 
case, in which the court used a DCF analysis to derive a fair value award of $24.65 per share, 
                                                
46 Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 171 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004), aff’d, 875 A.2d 
632 (Del. 2005). 
47 Id. at *58. 
48 Id. at *61. 
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which exceeded the deal price of $20.44 by around 20%.49 Despite noting that “as a general 
matter, an arms length transaction may be a good indicator of value,” that the transaction at issue 
“was the product of arm’s length negotiations,” and that “there is no suggestion that the sales 
effort was not professionally handled,” the court was nonetheless dissuaded from reducing the 
fair value award to a level at or below the deal price, due to a concession by the target’s 
investment banker that the sales process was “desperate.”50  
 These cases foreshadowed the result in the better-known, perhaps even notorious, 
litigation involving the acquisition of Dell by a private equity firm associated with Dell’s founder 
Michael Dell. In that situation, the Court of Chancery found that despite the presence of Mr. 
Dell, a director and 16% stockholder, on the buy side, the sale process used by the special 
committee of independent directors was sufficient to “sail through” any challenge based on a 
claim of breach of fiduciary duty.51 Finding a number of reasons to question the utility of the 
deal price as a measure of fair value, however, the court gave exclusive weight to a DCF 
valuation, and declined to give the deal price any weight “[b]ecause it is impossible to quantify 
the exact degree of the sale process 
mispricing.”52 Accordingly, the court set fair value at $17.62 per share, a 25% premium over the 
$13.75 per share deal price.53 
 The Court of Chancery’s opinion in Dell may have been the high-water mark in a series 
of cases in which the Delaware courts have acknowledged the theoretical utility of reliance on 
                                                
49 Cede & Co. v. MedPointe Healthcare, Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, *1-2 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 
2004). 
50 Id. at *77 n. 107. 
51 Appraisal of Dell, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, at *88. 
52 Id. at *168. 
53 Id. at *1, *51.  
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the deal price as an upper limit on fair value, but used DCF analysis to reach a fair value award 
substantially in excess of the deal price.54 
   b. Institutional Issues with DCF Analysis 
 Even as that series of cases unfolded, however, one could observe a countervailing trend 
in Delaware appraisal litigation. As the courts honed their technique in evaluating and applying 
discounted cash flow analyses, they became increasingly and visibly dismayed by the tendency 
of litigation experts to present “wildly divergent” DCF valuations.55 Unconstrained by the 
demands of clients deciding to pay or receive real money in a negotiated commercial transaction 
based on DCF analysis, litigation experts could proffer such analyses pushing at “the outer limits 
of plausibility.”56 Despite justly deserved commendations for their sophistication and energy in 
                                                
54 As discussed below (text at notes [-]), the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Chancery’s valuation in Dell, sharply criticizing the failure to rely more heavily on market data, 
including the deal price. 
55 Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchants Bancorp of Western Pa., Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, 
*80 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016). See also Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund 
Ltd., _ A. 3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *69] (“As is common in appraisal proceedings, each 
party—petitioners and the Company—enlisted highly paid, well-credentialed experts to produce 
DCF valuations. But their valuations landed galaxies apart—diverging by approximately $28 
billion, or 126%.”); In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litigation, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *2 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 2016) (“it is quite common for the petitioner’s expert in an appraisal to reach 
a DCF value twice that arrived at by the respondent’s expert”); Longpath Capital, LLC v. 
Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, *27 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“Much has been 
said of litigation-driven valuations, none of it favorable. Here, the parties have proffered widely 
disparate valuation numbers … .”); In re Dole Food Co., 114 A.3d 541, 557 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“In 
appraisal proceedings, the battling experts tend to generate widely divergent valuations as they 
strive to bracket the outer limits of plausibility.”); Finkelstein v. Liberty Digital, Inc., 2005 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 53, *41 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (“Men and women who purport to be applying 
sound, academically-validated valuation techniques come to this court and, through the neutral 
application of their expertise to the facts, come to widely disparate results, even when applying 
the same methodology.”). 
56 Dole Food, 114 A.3d at 557. The problem is not unique to Delaware appraisal litigation. See 
Kenneth Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Valuation Disputes in Bankruptcy, working paper (on 
file with authors) at 3 (in bankruptcy valuation proceedings, “the discounted cash flow (DCF) 
method is particularly susceptible to the kinds of manipulation that judges have difficulty 
evaluating. Because this method leans heavily on subjective assumptions that are difficult to test 
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evaluating those competing DCF claims,57 the Delaware courts have repeatedly acknowledged a 
concern about institutional limitations on their ability to effectively sort out those “wildly 
divergent” financial analyses.58 
 And as those courts have explicitly noted, the result of DCF analysis is highly susceptible 
to wide swings based on seemingly small variations in the inputs to the analysis.59 In one recent 
                                                                                                                                                       
if not entirely untestable, we believe this method is not well-suited for adversarial litigation in a 
bankruptcy case. It may be best used as a last resort when more transparent approaches 
(surrounding market evidence, comparable transactions or comparable company multiples) are 
unreliable, and only when discount rates can be calculated using well-grounded approaches.”).  
57 E.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The deterrence value of stockholder appraisal, in 
CLAIRE A. HILL & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, EDS., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS, ch. 16, at 349 (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 2016) (“the five members of the 
Court of Chancery are expert not only in the mechanics of valuation but also on the background 
market realities of public companies. … [T]he output of appraisal proceedings in Delaware can 
be expected to generate a valuation estimate of dissenters’ stock that is particularly credible.”); 
see also Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay Out of Corporate 
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 740 (2013) (“[T]he Delaware Court of Chancery is drawn 
from experts in the corporate law community. Because of these judges' detailed knowledge of 
business and business law, their decisions are informed, realistic, and highly respected.”). 
58 See, e.g., Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *69] (“When … an appraisal is brought in 
cases where a robust sale process … in fact occurred, the Court of Chancery should be chary 
about imposing the hazards that always come when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point 
estimate of fair value based on widely divergent partisan expert testimony.”); In re Dole Food 
Co., 114 A.3d 541, 555 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“as this court's opinions frequently have observed, the 
past and current members of this court are ‘law-trained judges,’ not valuation experts”); Huff 
Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2013) (in 
determining the value of real estate, “[a] law-trained judge would have scant grounds to 
substitute his own appraisal for those of the real-estate valuation experts, and would have no 
reason to second-guess the market price absent demonstration of self-dealing or a flawed sales 
process,” and valuation of corporate stock arises in the “much more complex venue of the sale of 
a corporate enterprise.”); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 359 
(Del. Ch. 2003) (“For me (as a law-trained judge) to second-guess the price that resulted from 
that [active sale] process involves an exercise in hubris and, at best, reasoned guess-work.”). 
59 E.g., Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., _ A. 3d at _ [2017 Del. 
LEXIS 518, *73-74] (“DCF valuations involve many inputs—all subject to disagreement by 
well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these inputs 
can produce large valuation gaps.”); Merion Capital LP v. Lender Processing Svcs. Corp., 2016 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, *89 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (“Small changes in the assumptions that drive 
the DCF analysis, however, generate a range of prices that starts below the merger price and 
extends far above it.”). 
2/26/18  
 19 
case, the court lamented the fact that the parties’ experts presented DCF-based valuations 
differed by a factor of over eight.60 Many DCF inputs can and often are disputed;61 judicial error 
in evaluating such disputes could be resolved by resort to finance principles that are widely 
accepted but not always applied by courts;62 but even within the constraints of such principles, 
there can be plausible variation between optimism and pessimism about the firm’s prospects that 
can cause major divergence among competing experts’ DCF valuations.63 
 The use of DCF analysis in appraisal litigation has also been criticized as skewed toward 
excessive valuations. One commentator suggests that management projections, although widely 
considered to be the most reliable basis for discounted cash flow analysis,64 may be 
                                                
60 ISN Software, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *2 (“In a competition of experts to see which can 
generate the greatest judicial skepticism regarding valuation, … this case, so far, takes the prize: 
one of the Petitioners’ experts opines that fair value is greater than eight times that implied by 
the DCF provided by the Respondent’s expert.”). 
61 In ISN, for instance, the eight-fold difference between the experts’ DCF valuations was 
attributable to disputes over a variety of inputs, including the initial cash flow projection period, 
anticipated incremental working capital requirements, and the size premium for determining the 
cost of equity. 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125 at *14-17.  See also Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global 
Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., _ A. 3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *74] (“management's 
projections alone involved more than 1,100 inputs”). 
62 Ayotte & Morrison, note [ ] above, at 11 (criticizing bankruptcy courts’ occasional acceptance 
of adjustment of the discount rate on account of firm-specific risk, despite “fundamental 
corporate finance theory, and recent evidence confirm[ing] that firm-specific risk is not relevant 
to valuation. Yet experts routinely adjust discount rates (upwards or downwards) to account for 
firm-specific risks.”). 
63 See, e.g., Peltz v. Hatten, 279 B.R. 710, 737-38 (D. Del. 2002) (“Simply put, when it comes to 
valuation issues, reasonable minds can and often do disagree. This is because the output of 
financial valuation models [is] driven by their inputs, many of which are subjective in nature. … 
The DCF method involves projections of future cash flows (which are largely dependent on 
judgments and assumptions about a company’s growth rate) and judgments about liquidity and 
the cost of capital.”). Most notably, differences of views about long-term growth (g) will 
substantially affect the estimation of terminal value, often a very large portion of the total firm 
value estimate. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The Real Problem with Appraisal Arbitrage, 72 BUS. 
LAW. 325, [] (2017). Similarly, experts can plausibly differ with regard to near term estimates of 
free cash flow, based on competing views of likely operating performance. 
64 E.g., Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd., et al. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. 11448-VCL, slip 
op. at 107 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (“As a source of estimated future cash flows, ‘Delaware law 
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systematically overstated due to inherent optimism or a desire on the part of management to 
demonstrate good performance, especially in anticipation of a potential sale in which their stock 
(or stock options) would be acquired.65 Another commentator urges that the courts have 
mistakenly used a future growth rate (g) that has been systematically excessive, due to the 
practice of accepting that growth in the terminal period calculation will equal average growth in 
GDP, without regard to required future reinvestment.66 
 Even in cases involving firms with actively traded shares followed by multiple 
institutional analysts, where one might expect more neutral valuation incentives than those of 
litigation experts, valuations may not coalesce within even a relatively narrow range. For just one 
recent example, nine different firms published target price estimates for Citigroup during the 
four-day period from July 14-17, 2017 and, despite the absence of any indication that those firms 
were relying on different information or had any idiosyncratic incentive that would affect the 
valuation, the resulting estimates ranged from $61 to $81 per share, a spread of over 30%.67 
                                                                                                                                                       
clearly prefers valuations based on contemporaneously prepared management projections 
because management ordinarily has the best first-hand knowledge of a company’s operations.’”) 
(quoting Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004); 
ACP Master, Ltd. v. Clearwire Corp., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *80 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017) 
(“The first key to a reliable DCF analysis is the availability of reliable projections of future 
expected cash flows, preferably derived from contemporaneous management projections 
prepared in the ordinary course of business.”) (quoting In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 89, *68 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017)). 
65 Peter Welsh, et al., Management Projections in Delaware Appraisal Litigation: Anecdotal 
Evidence, 31 INSIGHTS 15 (Oct. 2017) (suggesting systematic management bias to explain 
shortfalls between actual post-merger performance and pre-merger management estimates). 
66 Booth, 72 BUS. LAW. at 335 (using average GDP to reduce the discount rate is impermissible 
“unless projected return is reduced to reflect new investment.”). 
67 The estimates were: 
    Date  Target Price 
Barclays 7/17/2017 $70.00  
CFRA  7/14/2017 $68.00  
Credit Suisse 7/16/2017 $72.00  
Deutsche 7/14/2017 $61.00  
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 In many or perhaps even most litigation situations, experts will not even be constrained 
by contemporaneous and public DCF analyses. In such situations, the problem of wildly 
divergent analyses has been persistent and problematic, and a solution has been elusive. At one 
point there had been a dalliance with the idea that the court could precommit to accept one side’s 
position altogether, thereby encouraging the parties to avoid extreme valuation positions for fear 
of having the court accept their opponents’ contention. In 1997, however, the Delaware Supreme 
Court rejected that approach as inconsistent with the appraisal statute requiring the court to take 
into account all relevant factors in determining fair value.68 At this point, adopting that approach 
– sometimes described as “final offer arbitration” or the “baseball arbitration” approach – would 
require a repudiation of that decision, either by the Delaware Supreme Court or by legislative 
                                                                                                                                                       
Evercore ISI 7/17/2017 $ 68.00  
JPMorgan 7/17/2017 $72.00  
Oppenheimer 7/14/2017 $81.00  
Sandler O'Neill 7/17/2017 $76.00  
UBS  7/14/2017 $68.00  
 
(reports on file with authors). These estimates largely appear to reflect use of market multiple 
approaches to valuation, rather than more fully articulated DCF analyses, but we see no reason to 
expect less variation if firms were to use such DCF analyses more routinely. Cf. Ayotte & 
Morrison, note [ ] above, at 10, indicating that market multiple approaches are likely to result in 
less variability in valuation results than DCF analysis (in “46% of all cases, the experts fight over 
the discount rate (WACC) and in 76% they dispute the projected cash flows. By contrast, the key 
inputs to CCM [comparable company multiples] and TM [transaction multiple] valuations are 
much less likely to be disputed. Across all cases, none of the key inputs—the selection of 
comparable companies, the type of multiplier, or the enterprise value of the comparables—was 
disputed in more than 20% of the cases.”); see also Jeremiah Green, et al., Errors and 
Questionable Judgments in Analysts’ DCF Models, REV. ACCTG. STUD. (forthcoming), available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418478 (“we estimate that in our sample 
analysts make a median of three theory-related or execution errors and four questionable 
economic judgments per DCF.”). 
68 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361 (Del. 1997) (where the 
Chancellor “announced in advance that he intended to choose between absolutes, … the 
evidentiary construct he established for the subsequent trial created a standard for value 
determination which is at odds with Section 262's command that the Court ‘shall appraise’ fair 
value.”). 
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change. There are no indications that either of those options is being actively explored69 and, in 
any event, the evidence is at best equivocal that this approach would actually achieve its intended 
purpose of bringing the parties’ DCF-based valuation contentions closer together. At least one 
study of final offer arbitration finds that where parties have little to lose by going through the 
proceedings, and results are inherently uncertain, contentions actually become more extreme and 
do not converge as hoped.70 And in an appraisal litigation environment in which petitioners 
rarely achieve fair value awards significantly less than the deal price, and results are necessarily 
uncertain, empirical studies do not hold out much assurance that the courts’ frustration with 
divergent valuation contentions would vanish under a final offer arbitration-type process. 
 Another possible solution to the problem of divergent expert valuation opinions is the use 
of a court-appointed valuation expert. This idea is by no means new: it has been suggested 
                                                
69 Amici in the DFC appeal expressly invited the Delaware Supreme Court to revisit and modify 
the holdings in Gonsalves, but the court did not take up that invitation. Jennifer Arlen et al., Brief 
of Law and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae, DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield 
Value Partners, L.P. (Feb. 3, 2017), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/dfc-
holdings---appraisal.pdf at 23 (“if this Court were to limit or adjust the reasoning of Gonsalves v. 
Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., the trial judge could employ approaches that incentivize greater 
moderation among competing experts (such as “baseball arbitration” mechanisms), thereby 
narrowing the valuation gaps between their analyses.”). 
70 James B. Dworkin, Salary Arbitration in Baseball: An Impartial Assessment After Ten Years, 
14 ARB. J. 63, 69 (March 1986) (“For those parties going to arbitration, the process has not 
worked well in terms of causing the parties to submit reasonable final offers and final demands. 
The data indicate that the final positions of the parties are not converging upon one another but 
rather are spreading farther apart over time. Final-offer arbitrators may in fact be forced to select 
from between two unreasonable positions, as some critics of this procedure have claimed.”). See 
also Henry Farber, An Analysis of Final Offer Arbitration, 24 J. CONFL. RES. 680, 699 (1980), 
available at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/002200278002400407 (“final offers 
tend to diverge where there is more uncertainty,” and “using uncertainty to promote negotiated 
settlements will result in extreme awards where negotiations fail.”). On the other hand, Dworkin 
finds that “[f]inal-offer arbitration in baseball has worked well in terms of enticing the parties to 
bargain in good faith and settle their differences on their own.” 14 ARB. J. at 69; but see John L. 
Fizel, Play Ball: Baseball Arbitration After 20 Years, DISP. RES. J. 42, 45 (June 1994) (“The 
final-offer arbitration system has not reduced the gap between the demands of players and the 
offers of owners but the system has also not widened the gap, especially not as dramatically as is 
indicated by the use of average spread.”). 
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multiple times,71 it was essentially required practice under the appraisal statute before 1976 
(when an appraisal case initially was tried to a court-appointed “appraiser”72), and it was even 
tried, at least once, after appraisers were eliminated as a statutory requirement.73 For a number of 
possible reasons, however, the use of a court-appointed valuation expert has not caught on. For 
one thing, use of a court-appointed valuation expert inevitably creates an additional layer of 
litigation, because both sides understandably will want to have input into the neutral expert’s 
deliberations, thereby creating something of a trial within a trial,74 much like the abandoned 
                                                
71 E.g., Arlen, et al., note [ ] above, at 23 (“nothing in the statute prevents trial judges from 
engaging independent valuation experts to make a neutral recommendation to the court.”). Arlen 
et al. cite Cede & Co., 884 A.2d 26 at 34 for the proposition that the “Court of Chancery … 
appoint[ed] a non-lawyer to serve concurrently as an independent expert witness on valuation 
matters and as a special appraisal master.” Although literally correct, that fact doesn’t advance 
the idea very much: in Cede, the Supreme Court rejected that very appointment, finding that the 
court’s “appointment of a combination special appraisal master/independent expert witness and 
the delegation of responsibility for valuing the Technicolor shares is unlawful because it is 
contrary to the statutory mandate that "the Court [of Chancery] shall appraise the shares.” 758 
A.2d at 487; In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1222 (Del. 1992) (“if the Court is limited to the 
biased presentation of the parties, it is often forced to pick and choose from a limited record 
without the benefit of objective analysis and opinion. To compensate for this handicap, the Court 
of Chancery should consider, in a proper case, appointing its own expert witness.”). 
72 Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 360-361 (describing the requirement of appraisers under Section 262, 
until the statute was amended in 1976 to eliminate that requirement). 
73 See note [] above, describing the rejected appointment in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. See 
also Hintmann v. Weber, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 58, *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 1999) (appointing a 
special master to resolve “largely technical” issues remaining after issuance of a post-trial 
opinion on fair value);  
74 In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1223 (Del. 1991) (“The court appointed 
expert is subject to the same standards which govern other expert witnesses under the Delaware 
Rules of Evidence. The expert must advise the parties of all findings and submit to depositions. 
Once trial commences, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to arrange for the court's experts 
witness to testify if neither party calls him as a witness. The court's expert must be subject to 
cross-examination by both parties, even if one party chose to call him as its witness. Finally, the 
court's expert should be reasonably compensated by the parties in such proportion and at such 
intervals as the trial court determines.”). 
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statutory role of appraiser.75 In any event, in light of cases like Gonsalves and Technicolor, it is 
likely that excessive reliance on an independent valuation expert would constitute a failure to 
fulfill the court’s statutory affirmative requirement that the court “shall appraise” the fair value 
of the shares at issue.76 Even though the Delaware Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the 
Court of Chancery has the inherent authority to appoint neutral expert witnesses,"77 the court’s 
ability to rely on such neutral witnesses is clearly circumscribed by the requirement that the court 
make its own independent determination of fair value.  
   c. Increasing Reliance on Deal Price to Measure Fair Value  
 It is against that backdrop that the most recent judicial valuation trend emerged, in which 
- with respondents’ active encouragement – the courts began to rely more heavily on the merger 
price to establish fair value in appraisal litigation. As is well known to contemporary readers, 
that trend culminated in the Delaware Supreme Court’s 2017 opinions in DFC Global Corp. v. 
Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.78 and Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund 
Ltd.79 In DFC, the court concluded that in the case of an arm’s length merger arising out of a 
“robust market search” and free of any “hint of self-interest,” “economic principles suggest that 
the best evidence of fair value was the deal price.”80 In Dell, the court further cautioned that 
“when the evidence of market efficiency, fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to all logical 
                                                
75 Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 361 (“The legislative synopsis for the bill proposing this change [to 
eliminate the role of appraisers] recites that ‘[e]xperience has shown this two-step procedure to 
be wasteful of time and money.’ Comm. to H.R. 916, 128th G.A., 2d Sess. (1976) (enacted).”). 
76 Id., citing Section 262(h); see also id. at 360 (“The modern appraisal process presumes a 
sophisticated judge who exercises independence in determining the value of corporation in a 
contested proceeding.”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 496 (Del. 2000) 
(“reference of an entire appraisal proceeding and the use of masters to determine the ultimate 
valuation are not permitted by the present statutory appraisal scheme.”) (emphasis in original). 
77 In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d at 1222-23.  
78 172 A.3 346 (Del. 2017). 
79 [2017 Del. LEXIS 518,] _ A.3d __ (Del. 2017). 
80 DFC, 172 A.3d  at 349. 
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buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the support of [the founder]'s own votes is 
so compelling, then failure to give the resulting price heavy weight because the trial judge 
believes there was mispricing missed by all the [company’s] stockholders, analysts, and potential 
buyers abuses even the wide discretion afforded the Court of Chancery in these difficult cases.”81  
 We return below to discuss the ramifications of these opinions. They were by no means, 
however, the first instances in which the Delaware courts relied on deal price to determine fair 
value. One of the earliest instances of such reliance, in 1993, set the tone for several similar 
subsequent opinions. In Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co.,82 Vice Chancellor Hartnett made a 
number of prescient, insightful observations that resonate in later case law and in this article: 
                                                
81 Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518 at *67-68]. The court in Dell also reminded students 
of appraisal law that in appropriate circumstances, the price of a company’s stock in an efficient 
trading market can also “have substantial probative value.” _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 
*66]. In that case the court concluded that “the evidence suggests that the market for Dell’s 
shares was actually efficient and, therefore, likely a possible proxy for fair value.” Id. at *4. See 
also Aruba Networks, slip op. at 128 (“For Aruba, the unaffected public market price provides 
the best evidence of its value as a going concern.”). The “evidence” to which the court in Dell 
referred included proof of “a deep public float,” active trading (“with more than 5% of Dell’s 
shares [] traded each week”), wide analyst coverage, and “a bid-ask spread of approximately 
0.08%.” Id. at *7. These considerations mirror the factors used by courts to determine whether to 
apply the fraud on the market presumption in federal securities class action litigation: “(1) the 
average weekly trading volume expressed as a percentage of total outstanding shares of stock; 
(2) the number of securities analysts following and reporting on the stock; (3) the extent to which 
market makers and arbitrageurs trade in the stock; (4) the company’s eligibility to file SEC 
registration Form S–3 (as opposed to Form S–1 or S–2); and (5) the existence of empirical facts 
showing a causal relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an 
immediate price response.” Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rebutting the Fraud on 
the Market Presumption in Securities Fraud Class Actions: Halliburton II Opens the Door, 5 
MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 33, 51 (2016), citing Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 
1264, 1286–87 (D. N.J. 1989), and Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 473, 477–78 (N.D. Tex. 
2001) (“considering additional factors that include the company’s market capitalization, the bid-
ask spread for stock sales, and the stock’s trading volume without counting insider-owned stock 
(i.e. float)”). We have previously identified circumstances, however in which share market prices 
should not be relied upon to measure fair value. Rationalizing Appraisal Standards, note [] 
above, 50 B.C. L. REV. at 1034-37 (cautioning against use of share market prices in connection 
with mergers involving controlling shareholders or shares that are thinly traded). 
82 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, *23-25 (Del.Ch. June 8, 1993). 
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• First and most important, he recognized that at least where other evidence of fair value is 
unreliable, use of the deal price could be justified “under conventional principles of 
economics.”83 
• He further acknowledged that use of the deal price had been regarded as inappropriate 
because of the possible inclusion of a premium for control.84 
• Finally, he acknowledged that reliance on the deal price to measure fair value would have 
the detrimental effect of setting that price as a floor, thereby creating a “no-lose” 
proposition for appraisal petitioners.85 
 Despite Pabst’s general endorsement of deal price as a measure of fair value, that 
approach in appraisal litigation did not emerge again in appraisal litigation until over a decade 
later in the Union Illinois case, in which Vice Chancellor Strine, author of the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s subsequent opinion in DFC, cited Pabst as the basis for using deal price as the key point 
of reference for determining fair value.86 As he explained, “reliable evidence” of fair value 
“includes the transaction that gives rise to the right of appraisal, so long as the process leading to 
the transaction is a reliable indicator of value and merger-specific value is excluded.”87 Notably, 
the court rejected a DCF approach to valuation, where that alternative approach resulted in a 
                                                
83 Id. (“the results of the auction for Pabst might be expected to provide a reasonable indication 
of Pabst's value that this Court can consider in light of the parties' failure to satisfactorily provide 
a persuasive measure of value using other techniques.”). 
84 Id. (“Delaware courts in the past, however, have been unwilling to consider just the results of 
an "auction" between competing tender offerors as evidence of a firm's value because such offers 
ordinarily contain a control premium unrelated to the value of the firm as a going concern.”).  
85 Id. (“To allocate a pro rata share of a premium to dissenting shareholders would, in effect, 
make the deal price a "floor" for the appraisal value. By making the deal price a ‘floor’ for the 
appraised value, minority shareholders would be presented with a ‘no-lose’ situation if they seek 
an appraisal and dissents from mergers would therefore be encouraged.”). 
86 The Union Illinois 1995 Inv. L.P. v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 357 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
87 Id. 
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value below the deal price even net of a 13% discount for synergies.88 The contrast is striking 
with contemporaneous appraisal opinions (in MedPointe and eMachines)89, in which the court 
relied on a DCF approach to arrive at fair value in excess of the deal price. 
 Deal price as a measure of fair value emerged again in a 2007 Chancery opinion, in 
which the court accorded a weight of 75% to a fair value estimate based on the deal price, less a 
discount of 13% to account for deal synergies.90 The court reasoned that “a court may derive fair 
value in a Delaware appraisal action if the sale of the company in question resulted from an 
arm's-length bargaining process where no structural impediments existed that might prevent a 
topping bid.”91 Similar to Union Illinois, the court declined to accord weight to a DCF analysis, 
finding that “industry experts and executives do not consider a DCF a particularly important 
framework for valuing a company whose primary business is selling life insurance.”92 
 Perhaps emboldened by these opinions, the respondent in the Golden Telecom appraisal 
litigation arising out of a merger in 2007 urged Vice Chancellor Strine to rely on the deal price in 
a case in which the two largest stockholders (together owning over 44% of the stock) had an 
even larger equity interest in the buyer, and a special committee made no effort to engage in an 
active market check.93 Not surprisingly, the Vice Chancellor summarily rejected that contention, 
finding that “[t]here was no open market check that provides a reliable insight into [the target]'s 
value.”94  
                                                
88 Id. at 359. 
89 Notes – and – above. 
90 Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 61 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 54. 
93 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 503 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 
(Del.2010). 
94 Id., 993 A.2d at 499. 
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 On appeal, however, things took a confusing turn: according to the Supreme Court’s 
opinion, the respondent advanced the robust contention that the court should adopt a standard 
“requiring conclusive or, in the alternative, presumptive deference to the merger price in an 
appraisal proceeding.”95 The Supreme Court did not merely reject that contention and affirm the 
Vice Chancellor’s conclusion based on the factual finding that the merger price was an unreliable 
guide to fair value in the case at hand; rather, the Supreme Court rejected the use of a 
presumption of reliance on the deal price, “even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged 
transactional process.”96  
 That language – questioning the presumptive use of deal price “even in the face of a 
pristine, unchallenged transactional process” – of course does not literally preclude using the 
deal price to determine fair value; it merely rejects any presumption in favor of such use. But that 
observation seems like semantic formalism: when and why would “a pristine, unchallenged 
transactional process” not permit use of the deal price to determine fair value?97 And if a process 
endowed with such adjectives would not justify at least a presumption that the deal price is 
                                                
95 Id., 11 A.3d at 216. 
96 Id. at 218. 
97 The confusion may stem from imprecision about the nature of judicial presumptions. If deal 
price were presumptively determinative of fair value, the presumption would require such use of 
deal price in the absence of any proof reflecting on the quality of the sale process. See Federal 
Rules of Evidence Rule 301 (“In a civil case, unless a federal statute or these rules provide 
otherwise, the party against whom a presumption is directed has the burden of producing 
evidence to rebut the presumption.”). Even if the deal price were presumed not to measure fair 
value, once a respondent produced evidence demonstrating that the sale process was robust and 
“pristine,” any such presumption – which only operates in the absence of proof that establishes a 
result contrary to the presumed finding – would become irrelevant. See In re Transkaryotic 
Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 349 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“defendants cannot rely on rebuttable 
presumptions once plaintiffs have rebutted them.”); Staats by Staats v. Lawrence, 1990 Del. 
LEXIS 301, *5-6 (Del. 1990) (describing the legal effect of a presumption under Delaware Rules 
of Evidence Rule 301, and noting that although Rule 301 “specifically rejects the 
‘bursting bubble’ rule which requires only that the opposing party produce some evidence to 
rebut the presumption,” and that “once the presumption has been rebutted (whether at the level of 
production or persuasion), it bursts.”). 
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evidence of fair value, when would the deal price ever be used to measure fair value? In any 
event, the Supreme Court’s language in Golden Telecom surely had to be discouraging to any 
lower court judge asked to rely on deal price to measure fair value. Indeed, when the question 
arose thereafter in appraisal litigation, the court rejected a request to rely on the deal price to 
measure fair value, cautioning that cases supporting such reliance had been decided before 
Golden Telecom.98 And in Huff Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc.,99 the petitioners went 
so far as to argue that under Golden Telecom, the deal price was “now irrelevant in an appraisal 
context.”100  
 Nevertheless, the chancellors persisted.  Beginning in 2013, a series of opinions from the 
Court of Chancery embraced the deal price as a measure of fair value: 
• In the first of those opinions (CKx), the court echoed one of the elements of the reasoning 
twenty years earlier in Pabst: namely, that the court could rely on deal price if it 
concludes that the sale process was reasonable and that other techniques for assessing fair 
value are “unreliable.”101 Several subsequent cases took the same approach, relying 
exclusively on the deal price to determine fair value, but suggesting that such reliance 
was appropriate in part because other valuation approaches were unreliable.102 
                                                
98 Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, *16 (Del. Ch. 2013) 
(rejecting deal price as a measure of fair value in part because respondent “did not attempt to 
adjust the merger price to remove the ‘speculative elements of value that may arise from the 
'accomplishment or expectation' of the merger.’”). 
99 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2013), aff’d, 2015 Del. LEXIS 77 (Del. Feb. 12, 
2015). 
100 Id. at *34.  
101 Id. (“In the absence of comparable companies or transactions to guide a comparable 
companies analysis or a comparable transactions analysis, and without reliable projections to 
discount in a DCF analysis, I rely on the merger price as the best and most reliable indication of 
CKx's value.”). 
102 Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, *42, *52 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 
2015) (finding that the sale process was “comprehensive” and that, on the other hand, “there is 
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• Subsequent case law, however, appears to have disposed of any such limitation on 
restricting use of the deal price to situations in which other valuation techniques are 
unreliable. In Appraisal of Ancestry.com,103 the court relied exclusively on deal price; the 
court was satisfied that its DCF analysis was reliable, but relegated that analysis to a 
corroborative role of confirming that the sale process – which the court found 
"represent[ed] an auction of the Company that is unlikely to have left significant 
stockholder value unaccounted for" – provided “comfort that no undetected factor 
skewed the sales process,” reassuring the court in its resolve to rely exclusively on the 
deal price.104  
• Similarly, in Lender Processing105 the court relied exclusively on deal price, finding that 
the company “ran a sale process that generated reliable evidence of fair value,” and that 
even though the court’s own DCF analysis came out within 3% of the deal price, the 
court treated the DCF result as merely corroborative, because even though the projections 
                                                                                                                                                       
no reliable data to input into a DCF or comparable companies model.”); Longpath Capital LLC 
v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, *2 (finding that “the sales process in this 
instance was thorough” but that “the management projections that provide the key inputs to the 
petitioner's DCF analysis are not reliable. The parties agree that there are no comparable 
companies.”); Merion Capital LP, v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, *49, *64 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) (finding that the sale process was “robust,” and that management 
projections were “historically problematic, in a way that could distort value.”); In re Appraisal of 
PetSmart, Inc., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, *4 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (finding that the sale 
process was “reasonably designed and properly implemented,” but that the management 
projections that were the basis for DCF analysis were “fanciful,” and there was no “evidence for 
concluding that some other valuation methodology might lead to a reliable determination of fair 
value.”). The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Dell may also fall into this category: 
in that case, the noted “the obvious lack of credibility of the petitioners’ DCF model—as well as 
legitimate questions about the reliability of the projections upon which all of the various DCF 
analyses are based—[as] factors [that] suggest strong reliance upon the deal price and far less 
weight, if any, on the DCF analyses.” Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 518, *73]. 
103 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21 (Jan. 30, 2015). 
104 Id. at *50. 
105 Merion Capital LP v. Lender Processing Svcs., Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
16, 2015). 
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on which the DCF analysis was based were “reliable,” “[s]mall changes in the 
assumptions that drive the DCF analysis … generate a range of prices that starts below 
the merger price and extends far above it.”106 
 If there were any continuing thought from this case law development that use of the deal 
price to determine fair value depended on a showing that all other valuation techniques were 
demonstrably unreliable, the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion in DFC put an end to it. When 
the court said that “economic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal 
price,”107 it was well aware of the features of the specific legal context (statutory appraisal) in 
which those principles would operate, yet it concluded that “those features do nothing to 
undermine the ability of the Court of Chancery to determine, in its discretion, that the deal price 
is the most reliable evidence of fair value in a certain case … .”108 It is clear from this statement 
that as a matter of law, the courts can, in the right circumstances, select deal price to measure fair 
value, even if one or more other valuation techniques are reasonably reliable, simply because the 
deal price may be the “most” reliable evidence of fair value. 
  2. Critique of Reliance on Deal Price 
   a. Academic Commentary 
 Arriving at that point in the evolution of valuation doctrine was controversial among 
academics and practitioners. When the DFC case was on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court, 
two competing camps of scholars submitted opposing amicus briefs – one urging that the deal 
price should be presumed to constitute fair value,109 and the other contending that such 
                                                
106 Id. at *89. 
107 DFC 172 A.3d at 349. 
108 DFC, 172 A.3d at 367 (emphasis added). 
109 Stephen Bainbridge et al., Brief of Law and Corporate Finance Professors as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal, DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value 
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presumptive use of the deal price would unduly deter meritorious appraisal claims and harm 
stockholders.110 
 Although it could be said that the “deal price presumption” camp lost (in the sense that 
the Supreme Court declined to adopt a presumption in favor of using the deal price), these 
academic adversaries were not shooting at each other across a bright line, and the differences in 
their positions were not as stark as might have first appeared. Those advocating a presumption in 
favor of reliance on the deal price acknowledged that other approaches to determining fair value 
could be appropriate “where the transaction price bears indications of misinformation or bias,” or 
“where material information is withheld from the market.”111 Conversely, those arguing against 
the presumptive use of the deal price acknowledged that on appropriate facts the deal price could 
be used to measure fair value, and that “[t]he Court of Chancery should be permitted to marshal 
its equitable discretion to decide—on a case-by-case basis—how much weight merger price 
warrants relative to other factors.”112 The key question, then, is how the courts should exercise 
that discretion. 
   b. The Proper Scope and Benefits of Reliance on Deal Price  
 Whatever the merits of the various academic positions on the use of deal price to measure 
fair value, the Delaware courts appear to have arrived at a reasonably workable approach to the 
question. Most obviously, and consistent with the statutory and traditional judicial approach to 
appraisal litigation, they have rejected the use of any presumption regarding the use of deal 
                                                                                                                                                       
Partners, L.P. (Jan. 6, 2017), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/dfc-holdings---
bainbridge.pdf.  
110 Jennifer Arlen et al., Brief of Law and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae, DFC 
Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. (Feb. 3, 2017), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/dfc-holdings---appraisal.pdf. 
111 Bainbridge, et al., note [ ] above, at 16-17. 
112 Arlen, et al., note [ ] above, at 16. 
2/26/18  
 33 
price.113 Similarly, they have not chosen to look to the deal price to measure fair value in cases in 
which conflicts of interest on the part of a controlling stockholder or one or more members of the 
board of directors would lead a court in fiduciary duty litigation to require the proponents of the 
transaction to establish its entire fairness.114  
 In transactions in which the proponents have no conflict of interest, the Delaware courts 
do not appear to have developed any formulaic or bright line tool to determine when deal price 
should measure fair value.115 What we discern from the case law, however, is a tendency to rely 
on deal price to measure fair value where the transaction would survive enhanced judicial 
scrutiny, i.e., when a court would conclude that the transaction’s proponents have demonstrated 
that the process that led to the merger, although perhaps not yielding the optimum outcome for 
target stockholders, was nonetheless at least reasonable.116 Thus, in order to determine whether 
to use the deal price to establish fair value, the Delaware courts are engaging in the same sort of 
scrutiny they would have applied under Revlon if the case were one challenging the merger as in 
breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties. In effect, the courts are applying a presumption against 
                                                
113 DFC, 172 A.3d at 366; Golden Telecom, 11 A.3d at 217-218. 
114 E.g., Dunmire, note [] above. 
115 Lender Processing, note [] above, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *33 (“evaluating the reliability and 
persuasiveness of the deal price for purposes of establishing fair value in an appraisal proceeding 
is a multifaceted, fact-specific inquiry. The relevant factors can vary from case to case depending 
on the nature of the company, the overarching market dynamics, and the areas on which the 
parties focus.”). 
116 See DFC, 172 A.3d at 370-371 (“the purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the 
petitioners get the highest conceivable value that might have been procured had every domino 
fallen out of the company’s way; rather, it is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for 
their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly 
be given to them in an arm’s length transaction.”); Dell, _ A.3d at _ (2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 518, 
*62-63 (“The issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible 
bid. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not exploited.”); 
Aruba Networks, slip op. at 82 (the Delaware Supreme Court’s approach in DFC and Dell 
“appears to rule out inquiry into whether a different transaction process might have achieved a 
superior result.”). 
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use of the deal price to measure fair value, because unless the respondent demonstrates that the 
transaction process was reasonable, the court declines to use that measure of fair value.117 
Indeed, in a very recent opinion, the Court of Chancery coined the term “Dell Compliant” to 
identify what must be shown to establish that it “may consider the deal price as persuasive 
evidence of statutory fair value.”118 
 We discuss below the similarities in the considerations the courts have brought to bear in 
scrutinizing the deal process, in both appraisal and Revlon litigation, and conclude this section 
with some observations about the utility of the approach we have observed. 
    i. Appraisal Cases 
 In addition to confirming the absence of disabling conflicts of interest on the part of 
transaction proponents, the courts in appraisal litigation have identified a number of factors that 
incline them toward accepting the deal price as evidence of fair value.119 “Meaningful 
competition among multiple bidders during the pre-signing phase” appears to be the most 
compelling positive factor,120 and favoring use of the deal price to measure fair value based on 
                                                
117 Dell establishes, on the other hand, that “[t]here is no requirement that a company prove that 
the sale process is the most reliable evidence of its going concern value in order for the resulting 
deal price to be granted any weight.” Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *67 (emphasis in original). 
118 In re Appraisal of AOL, Inc., C.A. No. 11204-VCG (Del. Ch., Feb. 23, 2018) slip op. at 20.  
119 Id. (“A transaction is Dell Compliant where (i) information was sufficiently disseminated to 
potential bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii) without undue impediments 
imposed by the deal structure itself.”). 
120 Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189 at *45 (“The first factor supporting the 
persuasiveness of the Company's sale process is the existence of meaningful competition among 
multiple bidders during the pre-signing phase.”); BMC, 2015 WL 6164771, at *14-15 (reciting 
that the company conducted “a robust, arm’s-length sales process” that involved “two auctions 
over a period of several months,” where the company “was able to and did engage multiple 
potential buyers during these periods,” and where the lone remaining bidder “raised its bid 
multiple times because it believed the auction was still competitive.”); AutoInfo, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 128, at *34 (noting that the merger price was “the result of competition among many 
potential acquirers.”); Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, at *71 (target “actively solicited 
every buyer it believed could be interested in a transaction” before signing a merger agreement); 
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that factor is consistent with the views of even the scholars most skeptical about such use of the 
deal price.121  Even before DFC, however, and certainly afterward, it is clear that the presence of 
multiple competing bidders in the pre-signing phase is not a prerequisite to such use. In DFC 
itself, the acquirer was the only bidder, yet the court explained that “the fact that the ultimate 
buyer was alone at the end provides no basis for suspicion” of the deal price, given other indicia 
of a reasonable sale process.122 Earlier opinions also confirm that the deal price can be a reliable 
measure of fair value even in a single-bidder situation, as long as other circumstances 
demonstrate that “the process by which [the target was] marketed to potential buyers was 
thorough, effective, and free from any spectre of self-interest or disloyalty.”123 
 Those other circumstances, in addition to the absence of any conflict of interest, include 
the duration of the sale process124 and the efforts by the target and its investment banker to 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ancestry.com, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21 at *10 (“Ultimately, seven potential bidders submitted 
non-binding preliminary indications of interest”); Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359 (finding that the 
merger “resulted from a competitive and fair auction” in which “several buyers with a profit 
motive” were able to evaluate the company and “make bids with actual money behind them.”); 
CKx, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, at *47 (noting that “the bidders were in fact engaged in a 
process resembling the English ascending-bid auction” involving direct competition between 
bidders). 
121 Notes [ ] above. 
122 DFC, 172 A.3d at 376. It remains to be seen on remand, of course, whether the deal price will 
be given exclusive weight in determining fair value; but the Supreme Court specifically rejected 
the Court of Chancery’s determination to accord it only one-third weight. Id. at [ ] (“we cannot 
sustain the Chancellor’s decision to give only one-third weight to the deal price because the 
factors he cited in giving it only that weight were not supported by the record.”). 
123 Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 at *70-71, quoting CKx, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262 at 
*42. 
124 Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *52 (“The go-shop's forty-five-day window afforded 
potential bidders enough time to decide whether to continue to explore a transaction … .”); DFC, 
172 A.3d at  376 (“Houlihan had approached every logical buyer,” and “no one was willing to 
bid more [than Lone Star] in the months leading up to the transaction … .”). 
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contact potentially interested purchasers.125 Other cases using the deal price to measure fair value 
rely on the adequacy of information about the target available to potential bidders,126 and public 
awareness of the existence of the sale process.127 The courts have also looked to the scope of deal 
protections during the post-signing period, inclining toward reliance on the deal price as deal 
protections diminish in potential impact.128  
 It is instructive, on the other hand, to note what circumstances (again, apart from conflict 
of interest) have led the courts to decline to use deal price to measure fair value. The sample of 
such cases is small, and recently became even smaller with the reversal of the Court of 
Chancery’s opinion in Dell. In that case, “[a] confluence of multiple factors caused [the Court of 
                                                
125 Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 at *76-77 (target’s financial advisor “(1) contacted 
twenty-four third parties . . . ; (2) sent non-disclosure agreements (‘NDAs’) to twelve . . . ; (3) 
received executed NDAs from six . . . ; and (4) remained in discussions with three”). 
126 Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *60 (“the likelihood of a winner's curse can be 
mitigated through a due diligence process where buyers have access to all necessary 
information”)]; Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189 at *52 (“Another factor supporting 
the effectiveness of the sale process in this case was that adequate and reliable information about 
the Company was available to all participants, which contributed to the existence of meaningful 
competition.”); Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 350 (the company “was marketed in an effective manner, 
with an active auction following the provision of full information to an array of logical 
bidders.”). 
127 See Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *52] (“given leaks that Dell was exploring 
strategic alternatives, record testimony suggests that Evercore presumed that any interested 
parties would have approached the Company before the go-shop if serious about pursuing a 
deal.”); Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 at *82 (“This lengthy, publicized process was 
thorough and gives me confidence that, if Ramtron could have commanded a higher value, it 
would have.”). 
128 See, e.g., AOL, slip op. at 20 (absence of “undue impediments imposed by the deal structure 
itself” is a prerequisite to being “Dell Compliant” permitting reliance on the deal price); Aruba 
Networks, slip op. at 86 (reviewing deal protection terms and concluding that “[t]his combination 
of defensive provisions would not have supported a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”); Dell, _ 
A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *52-53] (“submitting a non-binding indication of interest that 
qualified as a Superior Proposal’ [] would lower the termination fee from $450 million to $180 
million thanks to ‘Excluded Party’ status and give that party months to scrutinize the Company's 
finances and growth prospects.”); In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 86 (Del. Ch. 
2007) (“the deal protections the Topps board agreed to in the Merger Agreement seem to have 
left reasonable room for an effective post-signing market check. For 40 days, the Topps board 
could shop like Paris Hilton.”) 
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Chancery] not to give greater weight to the deal price, including (i) the transaction was an MBO, 
(ii) the bidders used an LBO pricing model to determine the original merger consideration, (iii) 
there was compelling evidence of a significant valuation gap driven by the market's short-term 
focus, and (iv) the transaction was not subjected to meaningful pre-signing competition.”129 The 
court concluded that “there were structural impediments to a topping bid on the facts of the case, 
particularly in light of the size and complexity of the company and the sell-side involvement of 
the company's founder.”130 
 In a fashion that was at least in part predictable in light of its opinion in DFC, however, 
the Delaware Supreme Court rejected each of these considerations as a basis for disregarding the 
deal price.  First, use of an LBO pricing model based on demanded internal rates of return is no 
longer a legally viable reason to disregard the deal price in determining fair value. As the court 
explained in DFC, and reiterated in Dell, “[t]hat a buyer focuses on hitting its internal rate of 
return has no rational connection to whether the price it pays as a result of a competitive process 
is a fair one.”131  
 The “valuation gap driven by the market's short-term focus” likewise did not survive 
DFC as a reason not to rely on the deal price. In DFC, the Court of Chancery had reduced the 
significance attached to deal price in part because “DFC was in a trough with future performance 
dependent upon the outcome of regulatory actions … .”132 To this, the Supreme Court responded 
that (1) share markets take regulatory risk into account, (2) share trading prices have not lost 
relevance to fair value, and (3) buyers consider regulatory risk; simply because the company’s 
                                                
129 Lender Processing, *86 (summarizing the court’s previous decision in Dell). 
130 Id. at *87. 
131 DFC, 172 A.3d at 375. The Supreme Court reiterated that conclusion in Dell. _ A.3d _ at _ 
[2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *50]. 
132 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103, at *67-68. 
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“growth story was not accepted by the markets does not mean that the markets ignored it.”133 
And in Dell, the court similarly and emphatically rejected the suggested “valuation gap” as a 
reason to reject deal price as a measure of fair value.134 
 The court in Dell also rejected several of the Court of Chancery’s other justifications for 
declining to give weight to the deal price in determining fair value. It did so, however, because of 
what it found to have been a lack of factual support; the implication, therefore, is that if properly 
documented, those justifications could have supported the lower court’s decision not to give 
weight to the deal price. For example: 
• The court concluded that the company’s founder and largest stockholder, Michael Dell, 
“only had approximately 15% of the equity,” and had “pledged his voting power would 
go to any higher bidder, voting in proportion to other shares.”135 Had Mr. Dell’s holdings 
been larger, or had he not pledged to vote for a higher bid in proportion to other shares, 
perhaps the court would have viewed the effect of his involvement as an impairment of 
the sale process and, thus, a reason not to give weight to the deal price. 
• Similarly, the court rejected the lower court’s conclusion that “’Mr. Dell’s value to the 
Company’ imposed another impediment to the likelihood of rival bidders succeeding and 
thus dissuaded them from even trying.”136 The court found that this conclusion was 
factually unsupported, based on evidence that other bidders did not “’regard Mr. Dell as 
essential to their bids,’” and based also on the lack of evidence that he would not 
                                                
133 DFC, 172 A.3d at 375. 
134 Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *46] (“The record before us provides no rational, 
factual basis for such a ‘valuation gap’” where the market in Dell stock was proven to be 
efficient, for the reasons described in note [] above). 
135 Id. at _ [*55]. 
136 Id. at _ [*63]. 
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continue to serve the company if another bidder had prevailed.137 Had the evidence 
shown, however, that Mr. Dell’s participation with other bidders was essential yet 
unavailable, the court might well have concluded that the result of the sale process could 
not be relied upon to measure fair value.138 
• Finally, the court concluded that the “winner’s curse” theory – that bidders “resist 
outbidding incumbent management for fear they might later discover the information that 
management from bidding even higher in the first place”139 – “might deter rival bids in 
some MBOs,”140 but was rebutted in the Dell situation by (i) the fact that two financial 
sponsors submitted competing bids during the go-shop period, and (ii) the lower court’s 
finding that “all of the bidders received access to the data they requested.”141 
 What the Dell litigation ultimately highlighted was a central legal issue bearing on the 
relationship between fiduciary duty doctrine and the willingness of the courts to use deal price in 
appraisal proceedings. In no uncertain terms, the Court of Chancery in Dell emphasized that 
judged by enhanced scrutiny standards in fiduciary duty litigation, the merger would “sail 
through.”142 Yet the court at the same time decided not to give any weight to the merger price, 
                                                
137 Id. at _ [*64]. 
138 In AOL, the Court of Chancery employed similar considerations in declining to accept the 
deal price as a measure of fair value. The court noted that during the post-signing period the 
company “was constrained by a no-shop provision, combined with: (i) the declared intent of the 
acting CEO to consummate a deal with Verizon [the buyer], (ii) the CEO’s prospect of post-
merger employment with Verizon, (iii) unlimited three-day matching rights, and (iv) the fact that 
Verizon already had ninety days between expressing interest in acquiring the entire company and 
signing the Merger Agreement, including seventy-one days of data room access.” Id., slip op. at 
22-23. “Cumulatively,” the court concluded, “these factors make for a considerable risk of 
informational and structural disadvantages dissuading any prospective bidder.” Id. 
139 Id. at _ [*60]. 
140 Id. at _ [*62]. 
141 Id. at _ [*61]. 
142 Dell, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, *88. 
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“[b]ecause it is impossible to quantify the exact degree of the sale process mispricing.”143 Hence 
the key issue: if a merger satisfies even enhanced judicial scrutiny, can the deal price be 
irrelevant in determining fair value? Is the appraisal remedy thus somehow unmoored from the 
question of the reasonableness of fiduciary conduct in approving the merger? 
 DFC strongly suggested that the answer to these questions is no, and the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Dell eliminated any doubt about that suggestion. According to DFC, “the 
purpose of an appraisal … is to make sure that [dissenting stockholders] receive fair 
compensation for their shares in the sense that if reflects what they deserve to receive based on 
what would fairly be given to them in an arm’s-length transaction.”144 And what is “fairly 
given,” according to the court, is not some abstract, idealized concept of some inherent or 
intrinsic value;145 rather, fair value is what “a reasonable seller, under all the circumstances, 
would regard as within a range of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably accept.”146 
In Dell, the Supreme Court confirmed the link between a finding of appropriate fiduciary 
                                                
143 Id., *168. 
144 DFC, 172 A.3d at 371 . 
145 See Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 517 n. 126 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, 
11 A.3d 214 (“the hoary term "intrinsic value," [is] best reserved for judgments of the divine 
than ones made by human judges.”). 
146 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370, quoting Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1143 
(Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995). We share this rejection of the notion that 
stockholders are entitled to some inherent or intrinsic value, or that such a value even exists. This 
view marks our principal, if not only, quarrel with the premises of the most articulate opponents 
of the “market price rule.” See Albert Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” 
Appraisal Rule, [citation to current draft] at 5 (positing that appraised value can be “too high, too 
low, or just right by objective criteria.”) (emphasis added). We do not quarrel, however, with the 
suggestion that a legal definition of fair value that created a relatively high reserve price would 
have the effect of increasing observed merger premia. We do not venture an opinion as to 
whether such high premia would have a net positive wealth effect, taking into account the 
interests of acquirers and their investors, or whether such higher premia would reflect a legally 
imposed wealth transfer from acquirers to target stockholders. See also Callahan, et al., note [ ] 
above, at 5 (“if the anticipated appraisal right grows “too large,” it can be detrimental to target 
shareholder welfare (akin to imposing an unrealistic reserve price on an auction).”). 
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conduct and reliability of the deal price to measure fair value: reciting the lower court’s finding 
that the deal “easily would sail through if reviewed under enhanced scrutiny,” the court 
identified that finding as one that would “suggest the deal price deserves weight.”147 
 In any event, the range of reasonableness concept of fair value advanced in DFC is 
strongly evocative of enhanced judicial scrutiny under Revlon and its progeny,148 so it seems 
reasonable as a matter of doctrinal interpretation to conclude that the standard under Revlon for 
validating a merger involving a sale of control is equivalent to the standard under the appraisal 
statute for determining whether to use the deal price to measure fair value.  
 Subramanian argues for a somewhat stricter standard, including a presumption that the 
deal price measures fair value “in a true arms-length deal with meaningful price discovery.149 We 
suppose that his advocacy of any sort of presumption does not survive doctrinally after DFC, but 
we do not fault him for that advocacy. His centrist approach to the so-called “market price rule” 
issue is the closest to our own view, and if we part company with him, it is on the question of 
whether deal price can measure fair value where the sale process involved only a post-signing 
                                                
147 Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2016 Del. LEXIS, *56]; see also Aruba Networks, slip op. at 86-87 (noting 
that “would not have supported a claim for breach of fiduciary duty,” and concluding that “there 
is good reason to think that the deal price exceeded fair value and, if anything, should establish a 
ceiling for fair value.”). 
148 E.g., C&J Energy Servs. v. City of Miami Gen. Employees' & Sanitation Employees' Ret. 
Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014) (“a court applying Revlon's enhanced scrutiny must 
decide "whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
149 Guhan Subramanian, Using the Deal Price for Determining “Fair Value” in Appraisal 
Proceedings, at 23 (Feb. 6, 2017 draft), available at 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/20170206_Subramanian-draft_9aa5b475-ed61-
4fae-8b39-9b2de9d09425_78008941-390f-458a-a0e0-92863f300dc8.pdf, forthcoming in THE 
CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (U. Chicago Press) (“in a 
true arms-length deal with meaningful price discovery, there should be a strong presumption that 
the deal price represents fair value in an appraisal proceeding; but if the deal process does not 
include a meaningful market canvass and an arms-length process, deal price should receive no 
weight.”). 
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market check (via a go-shop provision) subject to a continuing match right. His position is that 
“an exclusive pre-signing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in which the buyer gets an 
unlimited match right would probably not qualify for deference to the deal price.”150 The use of 
the word “probably” makes it unclear how stringently this position should be applied, but we 
would reject, as the courts have done under Revlon, any position that the sale process is 
necessarily defective, such that the deal price should not be relied upon to measure fair value, in 
the event it entails an exclusive pre-signing negotiation followed by a go-shop process in which 
the buyer gets an unlimited match right.151 
 In any event, because we maintain that the Revlon line of case law can and should inform 
how the courts evaluate when to rely on the deal price in determining fair value, we find it 
helpful to review briefly how the courts applying Revlon have determined whether a merger 
survives enhanced judicial scrutiny.152 
    ii. Revlon Cases 
 That line of case law demonstrates that the Delaware courts have on occasion found that 
a sale process run by even a disinterested board of directors may fail to survive the enhanced 
judicial scrutiny required by Revlon. For example, in In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holders 
                                                
150 Id. at 22. 
151 Cf. In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 87 (Del. Ch. 2007) (concluding that where a 
merger agreement provided for a 40-day go-shop, a bifurcated termination fee and matching 
rights, “this approach to value maximization was likely a reasonable one,” even in the absence of 
a pre-signing market check); see also AOL, slip op. at 21 (“if front-end information sharing is 
truncated or limited, the post-agreement period should be correspondingly robust, so to ensure 
that information is sufficiently disseminated that an informed sale can take place and bids can be 
received without disabling impediments.”). 
152 We do not mean to suggest that the courts should not take into account the reliability of DCF 
analysis when deciding whether to rely on the deal price to determine fair value. To the contrary, 
particularly in a case in which the reasonableness of the sale process is closely contestable, the 
inclination to rely on deal price may vary inversely with the court’s confidence in the reliability 
of DCF analysis. See text at notes [-] above. 
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Litig.,153 the court preliminarily enjoined an acquisition by two private equity firms, finding that 
the board’s efforts to identify potential strategic bidders was inadequate154 and that for a micro-
cap company a post-signing market check should not be deemed as reliable as in the case of a 
widely followed, large-cap company.155 The court therefore concluded that “the board's failure to 
engage in any logical efforts to examine the universe of possible strategic buyers and to identify 
a select group for targeted sales overtures was unreasonable and a breach of 
their Revlon duties.”156 Similar findings in an appraisal case should presumably lead the court to 
decline to accept the deal price as a proxy for fair value. 
 In a case decided the same year as NetSmart, the court found that the directors’ conduct 
in a different phase of the deal process failed to meet Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny standard. In In 
re Topps Co. S’holder Litig.,157 the court focused on the board’s refusal to release a competitor 
(Upper Deck) from a standstill agreement in order to permit it to proceed with an offer for the 
target during a 40-day go-shop period. The court emphasized the importance of such a period 
where there had been no pre-signing market check, and concluded that the board’s “decision to 
foreclose its stockholders from receiving an offer from Upper Deck seems likely, after trial, to be 
found a breach of fiduciary duty” under Revlon.158 Had the case involved a statutory appraisal, it 
                                                
153 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
154 Id. at 196 (“What was never done by … the board was a serious sifting of the strategic market 
to develop a core list of larger healthcare IT players for whom an acquisition of Netsmart might 
make sense.”). 
155 Id. at 197 (“Precisely because of the various problems Netsmart's management identified as 
making it difficult for it to attract market attention as a micro-cap public company, an inert, 
implicit post-signing market check does not, on this record, suffice as a reliable way to survey 
interest by strategic players. Rather, to test the market for strategic buyers in a reliable fashion, 
one would expect a material effort at salesmanship to occur.”). 
156 Id. at 199. 
157 926 A.2d 58 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
158 Id. at 92. 
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seems likely that the court, for similar reasons, would have declined to use the deal price to 
measure fair value. 
 By contrast, a transaction can satisfy Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny even in the absence of a 
pre-signing market check and multiple bidders at any stage. In Pennaco, Inc. Shareholders’ 
Litig.,159 the court rejected Revlon claims where the board had negotiated exclusively with one 
bidder before entering into a merger agreement with that bidder, and no other bidder emerged. 
What was critical to the court’s acceptance of the sale process as reasonable was that the “board 
was careful to balance its single buyer negotiation strategy by ensuring that an effective post-
agreement market check would occur.”160 And what made the post-agreement market check 
effective was that “no substantial barriers to the emergence of a higher bid existed.”161 In these 
circumstances, the fact that no other bidder emerged, despite the fact that the transaction was 
well publicized and the company was widely followed, was taken by the court as “"evidence that 
the directors, in fact, obtained the highest and best transaction reasonably available."162 If a court 
in an appraisal proceeding were to reach the same conclusion, it seems almost certain, at least 
                                                
159 787 A.2d 691 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
160 Id. at 707. 
161 Id. (“The merger agreement's provisions leave [the acquirer] exposed to competition from 
rival bidders, with only the modest and reasonable advantages of a 3% termination fee and 
matching rights.”). Cf. Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, *45 (Del. 
Ch. May 21, 2013) (“in forgoing a pre-Agreement market check, and relying on an ambiguous 
fairness opinion, the Board had to be particularly scrupulous in ensuring a process to adequately 
inform itself that it had achieved the best price,” yet “deal-protection devices which included a 
no-shop clause and which provided that don't-ask-don't-waive provisions already in place would 
continue, prevent[ed] the Board from learning whether [two private equity buyers] were 
interested in bidding.”). 
162 Id., quoting Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings, 729 A.2d 280, 293 (Del. Ch. 
1998). 
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after DFC and Dell, that the court would look to the deal price as a significant or even exclusive 
factor in determining fair value.163 
 Nevertheless, Revlon’s enhanced scrutiny leaves plenty of room to address a scenario that 
has caused some justifiable concern on the part of critics of use of the deal price to measure fair 
value: specifically, a circumstance in which the compensation arrangements or other interests of 
the CEO or perhaps other senior managers as well create incentives on their part to negotiate and 
approve a deal and forgo the real possibility of alternative transactions that would provide greater 
value for stockholders generally.164 One can always quarrel about the extent to which the courts 
can effectively police the effect of such misaligned incentives,165 but existing doctrine certainly 
permits an inquiry into such incentives and their effects,166 and there is no motion to dismiss 
pleading stage obstacle to such an inquiry in appraisal cases. 
                                                
163 See Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *54] (the trial court’s “assessment that more 
bidders—both strategic and financial—should have been involved assumes there was some party 
interested in proceeding. Nothing in the record indicates that was the case. Fair value entails at 
minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the 
market would pay.”). 
164 See, e.g., Matthew Schoenfeld, The High Cost of Fewer Appraisal Claims in 2017: 
Premia Down, Agency Costs Up, working paper (Aug. 27, 2017), at 4, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028381 (CEOs willingness to accept 
suboptimal deals for stockholders “stems not only from CEOs’ ability to internalize 100% of 
their CIC package while externalizing most ‘costs’ of a lower transaction price, but also from 
any additional rents they are able to extract—via transaction-related bonuses or ex-post 
Parachute augmentations—at the expense of disinterested shareholders.”). 
165 Schoenfeld plainly maintains that the current litigation system fails to do an adequate job: 
“Amid the recent enfeeblement of germane shareholder litigation, it is perhaps not surprising 
then that as premiums have fallen, Parachutes and related bonuses have burgeoned.”) Id.  
166 For example, plaintiffs in Pennaco argued that the golden parachutes of the senior officers 
motivated them and the board to accept a poor deal. Although the court rejected the argument on 
the facts – the two senior officers were also very large stockholders who were unlikely to have 
sacrificed substantial value for the stock just in order to activate their severance payments – the 
court was at least open to entertaining this argument against reliance on the deal price. 787 A.2d 
at 708-710. In contrast, in El Paso S’holders Litig., 41 A.3d 432, 443 (Del. Ch. 2012), the court 
found a likely breach of fiduciary duties under Revlon in part because of the CEO’s personal 
interest in acquiring a business from the company’s merger partner. As the court explained: 
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 iii. The Continuing Utility of Appraisal (and Appraisal 
 Arbitrage)   
 
 By suggesting that the inquiry whether to use the deal price to measure fair value should 
be as demanding (or undemanding) as enhanced scrutiny under Revlon, we are not contending 
for any sort of “market price rule” or presumption in favor of using the deal price to measure fair 
value; to the contrary, we argue in favor of the opposite presumption, under which respondents 
in appraisal cases who argue in favor of such use of the deal price will be required, as with any 
valuation contention in appraisal cases, to come forward with evidence sufficient to establish the 
reasonableness of the sale process.167 As a result, there is no reason to think that the test of 
whether to use the deal price in appraisal cases will be any less demanding than the application 
of the enhanced scrutiny standard in Revlon preliminary injunction cases. 
 In fact, with post-closing damages claims under Revlon having been substantially 
circumscribed by the impact of stockholder approval of mergers after Corwin,168 it may be the 
                                                                                                                                                       
“when there is a reason to conclude that debatable tactical decisions were motivated not by a 
principled evaluation of the risks and benefits to the company's stockholders, but by a fiduciary's 
consideration of his own financial or other personal self-interests, then the core animating 
principle of Revlon is implicated. As Revlon itself made clear, the potential sale of a corporation 
has enormous implications for corporate managers and advisors, and a range of human 
motivations, including but by no means limited to greed, can inspire fiduciaries and their 
advisors to be less than faithful to their contextual duty to pursue the best value for the 
company's stockholders.” Id. at 439. See also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866 (Del. 
1985) (finding directors personally liable for breach of fiduciary duty in approving a merger 
largely negotiated by a CEO whose retirement was imminent and who opposed a potentially 
better LBO deal in which younger members of management might take his place). 
167 Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 221 (Del. 2005) (“In a statutory 
appraisal proceeding, each side has the burden of proving its respective valuation positions by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”); M.G. Bancorporation v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del. 
1999) (“In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving their 
respective valuation positions by a preponderance of evidence.”). 
168 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312-313 (Del. 2015) (“[W]hen a 
transaction is not subject to the entire fairness standard, the long-standing policy of our law has 
been to avoid the uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the disinterested 
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appraisal remedy, rather than the class action for breach of fiduciary duty, that will supply the 
primary private litigation check on the conduct of the sale process.169 We see this possibility as a 
salutary one, for two principal reasons. First, as Subramanian notes,170 bidders who face the risk 
of post-closing appraisal litigation will have an incentive – so long as the appraisal remedy 
remains viable – not to impose demands upon target boards that would increase the prospect that 
the court would decline to find the sale process to have been reasonable, and thereby increase the 
risk of an appraisal award substantially greater than the deal price.171 Second, we concur with the 
assessment of Korsmo and Myers that appraisal litigation (especially where driven by appraisal 
arbitrage) is structurally superior to class action litigation in the sense that there is less concern 
that the litigation will be driven by counsel, and a greater likelihood that the litigation will be 
initiated and resolved based on the interests of clients with substantial investments in the shares 
at issue.172 
                                                                                                                                                       
stockholders have had the free and informed chance to decide on the economic merits of a 
transaction for themselves.”). 
169 See Korsmo & Myers, note [ ] above, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. at 1599 (“If … a merger is agreed 
to at a price far enough below fair value—measured in conventional financial terms—appraisal 
arbitrageurs will have an incentive to accumulate a position and seek appraisal. In so doing, the 
arbitrageur will serve as a check on low-ball merger agreements and freeze-outs.”). 
170 Subramanian, note [] above, at 19 (buy side principals and their advisers “could encourage the 
sell-side board to have a good deal process (pre-signing auction, no matching rights, etc.) in 
order to reduce their post-closing appraisal risk.”). Subramanian also points out, however, that 
such encouragement might be limited because it could (and would presumably be intended, in 
effect) to drive up the acquisition price. Still, fostering an incentive to bidders to avoid excessive 
demands for bidding advantage and deal protections would be a useful countervailing effect of 
an appraisal rule that required examination of the quality of the sale process. 
171 Dell, _ A.3d at _ [2017 Del. LEXIS 518, *73] (“If the reward for adopting many mechanisms 
designed to minimize conflict and ensure stockholders obtain the highest possible value is to risk 
the court adding a premium to the deal price based on a DCF analysis, then the incentives to 
adopt best practices will be greatly reduced.”). 
172 Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. at 1555 (appraisal “litigation [is] 
controlled, by the actual plaintiff—the appraisal arbitrageur—rather than the plaintiffs’ attorney. 
… In addition, the narrow focus of an appraisal claim and the possibility a court will determine 
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 It is not our view, however, that appraisal arbitrage, coupled with rejection of the deal 
price where conflicts of interest or other deficiencies in the sale process render the deal price 
unreliable as a measure of fair value, will necessarily result in the most completely balanced 
check on opportunism. We say this because unmitigated reliance on unadjusted deal price creates 
a no-lose rule, presciently warned against a quarter century ago in Pabst:173 with a statutory 
presumption of an award of fully compensatory pre-judgment interest,174 appraisal arbitrageurs 
would suffer little or no down side and could afford to be undiscriminating in targeting deals 
tainted by conflict of interest or process failures. As a result, that system would elicit over-
litigation of appraisal cases because, in our view, an unadjusted deal price frequently overstates 
fair value. Why? Because, as the Delaware courts have repeatedly held, the deal price may (and 
often does) include synergistic value to which the target’s stockholders, as such, have no legal or 
economic claim of entitlement. In the section that follows, we therefore address how the 
determination of fair value should take account of synergistic merger gains in order to arrive at 
an appropriate balance of risk in appraisal litigation.175 
                                                                                                                                                       
fair value to be below the merger price render the risks and costs of litigation far more symmetric 
than in other forms of shareholder suit, further reducing the potential for nuisance claims.”). 
173 Note [] above. 
174 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (“Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise for 
good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the merger through the date of payment of 
the judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the Federal Reserve 
discount rate . . . .”). We concur with Korsmo and Myers, however, that the statutory 
presumptive interest rate is unlikely in itself to generate additional appraisal litigation. Id. at 
1555, 1580-1581 (“Given the risks an appraisal petitioner must assume—an extended period of 
illiquidity with an unsecured claim against a surviving company that may be highly leveraged, 
plus the risk of the legal claim itself—the idea that interest rates are driving sophisticated parties 
to target appraisal is implausible.”). Of course, compensatory pre-judgment interest eliminates an 
artificial disincentive to pursue litigation. 
175 Because we believe that appropriately deducting synergistic value from the deal price will 
achieve an appropriate balance of risk, we do not support the more aggressive step of 
establishing a privately ordered cost-shifting regime, which - if elected - would require appraisal 
arbitrageurs to pay the defendant corporation's legal fees and costs in the event that such 
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IV. THE IMPACT OF SYNERGIES ON FAIR VALUE  
 A. Case Law 
 Among the clearest propositions in Delaware appraisal case law is that if deal price is to 
be used to determine fair value, it must be adjusted to eliminate the portion of that price 
attributable to synergistic merger gains. That legal proposition has been stated as follows: 
Cavalier Oil and its progeny seem to require the court to exclude “any value that the 
selling company’s shareholders would receive because a buyer intends to operate the 
subject company, not as a stand-alone concern, but as part of a larger enterprise, from 
which synergistic gains can be extracted.”176 
 
That proposition has been invoked frequently in the case law,177 and appears to be “inspired by a 
desire to honor the statute [Section 262]’s command that the court ‘determine the fair value of 
                                                                                                                                                       
defendant carries the burden of proof in demonstrating the fairness of the merger price. Jay B. 
Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 134-136 
(2017) (“the possibility of fee shifting should serve as a meaningful deterrent against 
unmeritorious and low-probability claims, and improve acquirers' settlement leverage if they 
honestly believe the merger price was fair.”). 
176 DFC, 172 A.3d at 368, quoting Union Illinois 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 
847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2004), citing Cavalier Oil , 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989). 
177 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., A.3d at__[2017 Del. LEXIS 
518, *39], citing Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del. Ch. 2010), 
aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010) (“the court should exclude ‘any synergies or other value expected 
from the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself.’”); Aruba Networks, slip op. at 53 
(same); ACP Master, Ltd. et al. v. Sprint Corp., et al., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *79 (Del. Ch. 
July 21, 2017) (“the appraisal statute requires that the Court exclude any synergies present in the 
deal price, that is, value arising solely from the deal.”); In re Appraisal of SWS Group Inc., 2017 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 90, *29 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017) (“When the merger price represents a transfer 
to the sellers of value arising solely from a merger, these additions to deal price are properly 
removed from the calculation of fair value."); Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchs. Bancorp of W. 
Pa., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, *28 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016) (“the Court's task in a Section 
262 appraisal action is to determine the going concern value of the enterprise as of the merger 
date exclusive of any element of value—such as the value of achieving expected synergies—
from the accomplishment of the merger.”); Longpath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, *83 (Del. Ch. June 30 2015) (“in an appraisal action, it is inappropriate to 
include merger-specific value”); Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 72 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (“The court must … exclude synergistic elements from the sale price to arrive at a fair 
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the shares exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of 
the merger.’”178 
 There is remarkably little clarity or consistency in the case law, however, about how to 
apply this proposition. The courts’ treatment of precisely what synergistic value to exclude in 
specific cases has been erratic, no doubt because of inconsistencies in the quality of proof, rather 
than any inability on the part of the courts to assess the evidence. Key examples, however, 
include: 
• Union Illinois: In this relatively early case, the court observed that the finance literature 
“does not contain a reliable method for estimating the portion of a merger premium that 
results from expected synergy value.”179 Nevertheless, the court approved “a reasonable 
synergy discount of 13%,” because potential bidders were large banks that expected 
synergistic gains, and the target’s banker’s “DCF model, which it used in giving its 
fairness opinion, had mid-range synergy assumptions of 15%-20% for the synergy value 
that would be shared with [target] as a seller.”180 
• AXA: The court approved a discount of $4.12 per share, 13% less than the deal price of 
$31 per share, based on accepting a corrected “sum of the parts” evaluation of the target 
                                                                                                                                                       
value.”); Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 220 (Del.Ch. 2005) (“In 
performing its valuation, the Court of Chancery is free to consider the price actually derived 
from the sale of the company being valued, but only after the synergistic elements of value are 
excluded from that price.”);  M.P.M. Enterprises, Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 796 (Del. 1999) 
(valuation approach “was undoubtedly proscribed by § 262(h)” “because it focused on the 
elements of value that would arise from the merger, rather than on the going concern value of 
MPM without any consideration of such synergistic values.”). 
178 DFC, 172 A.3d at 368, citing Section 262(h). 
179 Id. n. 35, citing John C. Coates IV, “Fair Value” as an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: 
Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1351-52 (1999). 
180 Union Illinois, at n. 26. 
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of $26.88 per share.181 The court declined to accept a synergies estimate based on a 
discounted cash flow analysis that the expert in question found unreliable as a basis for 
evaluation of the firm itself.182 
• Ramtron: The court accepted a synergy discount of $0.03 per share (less than 1%) from 
the merger price of $3.10 per share.183 The court’s calculation of that estimate was more 
opaque than the derivation of the approximately 11% estimate that the court rejected, an 
estimate which was based on two distinct approaches: (i) estimating the ratio of 
premiums paid by strategic and financial buyers generally, on the theory that the 
difference between the two is attributable to synergies, and (ii) inferring total synergies of 
$0.69 per share from a comparison of target stand-alone projections with the buyer’s 
projections, and assuming that 50% of those synergies would be shared with the target’s 
stockholders.184 The court rejected the first approach because it “does not tell me 
anything about this specific transaction, which must be the focus in a Section 
262 action.”185 It rejected the second approach because it “focuses solely on cost savings, 
which are positive synergies, and neglects the possibility of negative synergies.”186 The 
petitioner’s expert’s 1% estimate of synergy ostensibly took into account testimony about 
                                                
181 Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61. The court placed a 75% weight on the result (deal price minus 
estimated synergies). 
182 Id. The court had found that “industry experts and executives do not consider a DCF a 
particularly important framework for valuing a company whose primary business is selling life 
insurance.” Id. at 54. 
183 Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 at *85-86. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at *85 (emphasis in original). 
186 Id. at *86. 
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negative synergies, so the court found that it “better conforms to the evidence adduced at 
trial than Ramtron's position.”187 
  
 B. Defining Synergies in a Fair Value Determination 
 Given the clear position that synergy value shared with the target’s stockholders by 
inclusion in the purchase price must be deducted from the price where the deal price is used to 
determine fair value, Delaware law could benefit from a similarly clear articulation of what 
constitutes synergy for purposes of this calculation, and how that calculation should be made.188 
We begin with the first of these two topics. 
 The task of defining synergy is superficially simple: as expressed in a recent Delaware 
appraisal case, it is “value arising solely from the deal.”189 As previously noted, this definition 
proceeds from and tracks the appraisal statute’s exclusion of “any element of value arising from 
                                                
187 Id. 
188 We thus focus on the definition of synergies from a legal perspective. From a financial 
perspective, synergies come in a variety of categories. See, e.g., Anna Loukianova, et al., 
Valuing Synergies in Strategic Mergers and Acquisitions Using the Real Options Approach, 14 
INV. MGMT. & FIN. INNOV. 236, 236 (2017) (“Operating synergies involve the improvement of 
companies’ operating activities. They can be achieved, because, since the combined firm is 
bigger than any of the companies before the M&A deal, it can exert economies of scale, exercise 
greater pricing power and provide new opportunities for growth in new or existing markets. 
Financial synergies come from the fact that the merged firm can bring better debt capacity, as 
well as the tax benefits resulting from operating losses from the target firm, asset revaluations, 
etc.”); Taher Hamza, et al., How Do Takeovers Create Synergies? Evidence from France, 11 
Studies in Business & Economics 54, 55 (2016), available at 
http://eccsf.ulbsibiu.ro/RePEc/blg/journl/11105hamza&sghaier&thiraya.pdf (“Higher operating 
synergies are synonymous with revenue increase, cost savings, investment cutbacks and greater 
market power. Indeed, enhanced efficiency with regard to productive assets improves the 
operating cash flows, leading to heightening of the firm's value. As for financial synergies, they 
encompass tax savings and decreased bankruptcy risk through diversification of the merged 
entity, which generates lower weighted average cost of capital.”). 
189 ACP Master, Ltd. et al. v. Sprint Corp., et al., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *79 (Del. Ch. July 
21, 2017). 
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the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”190 Despite this superficial simplicity, 
however, determining whether an element of value arises “from” the merger can be deceptively 
complex.  
 To illustrate this, consider the famous case of Smith v. Van Gorkom.191 In that case, the 
operative reality of the target company (TransUnion) included the fact that despite strong cash 
flows, accelerated depreciation prevented it from generating sufficient taxable income to use its 
investment tax credits.192 The value of those tax credits might have been exploited in two ways: 
the first way (the one that actually occurred) was a sale of the company to an acquirer able to 
apply the tax credits to its income from other sources; the second way, which TransUnion 
considered, was to acquire additional income-generating businesses.193 Let us assume (although 
the record is not completely clear on the point) that the $55 per share merger price included some 
amount attributable to the value the acquirer expected to realize through use of TransUnion’s 
investment tax credits.  Should that amount be deducted from the deal price in measuring fair 
value, because it was value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger? 
 In a literal sense the answer is clear: of course it should be deducted, because it was the 
merger that enabled the acquirer to extract (and pay target stockholders for) the value of the tax 
credits. Suppose, however, that TransUnion was also in a position to extract that value on its 
own, through a program of asset acquisitions.194 In that circumstance, would it still be 
appropriate to make the deduction?  
                                                
190 DFC, 172 A.3d at 368, citing Section 262(h). 
191 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
192 Id. at 864-865. 
193 Id. at 865. 
194 This assumption may be counterfactual: according to the recollection of counsel for the 
acquirer, TransUnion “had a lot of tax law carry forwards. They didn't have enough operating 
income to take full advantage of them, and that in a sort of perverse way was causing a burden 
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 In previous writings we have claimed that the answer is no: the potential to extract value 
from the tax credits should be viewed as having been an opportunity belonging to Trans Union, 
and even if that value was ultimately achieved through the mechanism of the merger, that value 
should be treated as belonging to TransUnion and thus a component of its fair value for appraisal 
purposes.195 In that case, in our view, it would be improper to reduce the fair value determination 
by the putative synergy component of the deal price, because to do so would deprive target 
stockholders of an element of value of the going concern (namely the target’s own opportunity to 
extract value from the tax credits).  
 A hypothetical further illustrates this point. Consider the case of a target firm owning a 
set of patents that would be valuable to a company with capital and marketing clout sufficient to 
exploit the patents. Assume further, however, that the target firm lacks both of these attributes, 
and that a merger with a well-heeled acquirer enables the combined firm to generate substantial 
value from the patents. Again, should a portion of that value, if shared with target stockholders, 
be deducted from the deal price to arrive at a fair value for their stock? And again, our answer is 
no, or at least not necessarily, even though it could be said that the value arose from the 
accomplishment or expectation of the merger. Why? Because we have not excluded the 
possibility that the target could, on its own, have realized such value (or at least a substantial part 
of it) through an agreement to license the patents. In that circumstance, the potential additions to 
                                                                                                                                                       
on their stock. So they couldn't buy companies fast enough and manage them to take care of that 
problem.”). Transcript of interview with A. Gilchrist Sparks III, Jan. 24, 2017, at 21, available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/6758-sparks-vangorkom-interview-transcript.  
195 Hamermesh & Wachter, Cornfields, note [] above, 31 J. CORP. L. at 164-165 (proposing use 
of the corporate opportunity doctrine to define when potential future cash flows belong to the 
corporation, and should therefore be considered to contribute to the fair value of the 
corporation’s shares). 
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cash flow, while in fact brought about by the merger, could just as well be considered to have 
belonged to the target firm.196 
 Our point is that in evaluating a deduction for synergies, courts and litigants should be 
careful to distinguish between gains that arise solely from the merger – solely, in the sense that 
the gains would not have come about but for the occurrence of the merger – and gains that would 
likely have been achieved by the company on a standalone basis. This distinction still leaves 
plenty of room to identify synergies that really do arise solely from the merger. Although cost 
reductions (staff reductions, for a typical example) may in some circumstances be achievable by 
the going concern on a standalone basis, they would surely arise solely from the merger if they 
could not realistically be achieved by the target on that basis, and depend for their existence on 
scale that would not exist but for the merger.  
 Defining the appropriate scope of deductible synergies implicates one further and 
probably controversial question relating to the value of control. The key example is the leveraged 
buyout led by a private equity firm. In that situation, as we have written previously, “the 
aggregation of the shares is value-creating because a controller can then exercise the control 
rights involving directing the strategy and managing the firm.”197 Should that incremental value 
be treated as part of the operative reality of the going concern, or as a value arising only from the 
accomplishment of the merger (and therefore not part of fair value in appraisal litigation)? 
                                                
196 An even clearer case for treating gains ostensibly connected to a merger as belonging to the 
acquired firm is where the merger is accomplished by a controlling stockholder which, before the 
merger occurs, had begun to implement the improvements that follow the merger. See Coates, 
note [] above, 147 U. PA. L. REV.at 1350-1351, describing Weinberger v. UOP and Cede & Co. 
v. Technicolor, Inc. (“the synergies included in fair value determinations in those two cases were 
limited to synergies that both were ‘known’ as of the date of the merger and were related to steps 
that had previously been taken by the controlling shareholder, so that the synergies were 
plausibly ‘part of’ the company being valued.”). 
197 Rationalizing Appraisal Standards, 50 B.C.L. REV. at 1052. 
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Decisions from the Court of Chancery would suggest that such incremental value should be 
viewed as part of the value of the going concern.198 We have taken the contrary position, 
however, because “the value is created by the aggregation process and does not exist 
independent of it, [so] the logical and normatively compelling conclusion is that the value 
creation should accrue to the party that has created it.”199 Applying that reasoning to our 
example, the private equity purchaser, by consolidating ownership and control through the 
purchase of disaggregated shares, creates additional value that could not be generated by the firm 
as constituted (with agency costs arising due to disaggregation of control), and that additional 
value must be excluded from the determination of fair value.200 
 C. Estimating the Size and Allocation of Synergies 
 
 Having arrived at an appropriate, if necessarily imprecise, definition of synergy for 
purposes of the legal context of determining fair value in an appraisal proceeding, the remaining 
– and not insubstantial – task is to articulate an appropriate approach for courts and litigants to 
take in estimating the total amount of synergies expected to arise from a merger, and identifying 
the portion of that amount incorporated in the deal price and thereby shared by the buyer with the 
                                                
198 Id., citing Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, *70 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
19, 2005); Borruso v. Communc’ns Telsys. Int’l, 753 A.2d 451, 458-59 n. 10 (Del. Ch. 1999); 
LeBeau v. M.G. Bancorp, Inc., 1998 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, *39 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998); but see 
[next footnote].  
199 Id. The recent opinion in Aruba Networks embraces this view. Id., slip op. at 126-127 (“When 
an acquirer purchases a widely traded firm, the premium that an acquirer is willing to pay for the 
entire firm anticipates incremental value both from synergies and from the reduced agency costs 
that result from unitary (or controlling) ownership. Like synergies, the value created by reduced 
agency costs results from the transaction and is not part of the going concern value of the firm.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
200 We develop this point more fully in Rationalizing Appraisal Standards, at 1047-1054. Again, 
we recognize that the view of Delaware courts may be at odds with our own. See, e.g., In re 
Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21 at *50 (suggesting that in an acquisition by a non-
strategic purchaser, synergies are unlikely: “as is typical in a non-strategic acquisition, I find no 
synergies that are likely to have pushed the purchase price above fair value.”); but see Aruba 
Networks, slip op. at 126-127. 
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target’s stockholders. At the outset of this discussion, we acknowledge that there is remarkably 
little scholarship, in law, finance or economics, on this precise subject.201 Accordingly, what we 
have pieced together below from that limited scholarship and from informal presentations by 
several investment bankers202 is a suggestion of how appraisal litigants and the courts might 
approach the issue of synergies. 
 The matters of estimating overall synergies and evaluating how they are allocated as 
between the buyer and target stockholders are two quite distinct determinations, and we therefore 
address them separately. 
  1. Estimating Total Synergies 
 It has been suggested that total synergies arising from an acquisition can be estimated 
using the following three-step calculation: 
 1. “[V]alue the firms involved in the merger independently, by discounting expected cash 
flows to each firm at the weighted average cost of capital for that firm. 
 2. “[E]stimate the value of the combined firm, with no synergy, by adding the values 
obtained for each firm in the first step. 
 3. “[B]uild in the effects of synergy into expected growth rates and cash flows and … 
revalue the combined firm with synergy. The difference between the value of the combined firm 
                                                
201 See, e.g., Raffaele Fiorentino & Stefano Garzella, The Synergy Valuation Models: Towards 
the Real Value of Mergers and Acquisitions, 124 INT’L RES. J. OF FIN. & ECON. 71, 72 (2014), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2195551 (“theoretical and 
empirical research still lacks a common understanding of the effectiveness of synergy valuation 
models in M&A.”). 
202 In particular, we acknowledge with gratitude insights from James DelFavero (Goldman 
Sachs), Erik Gilje (Wharton School), and Jonathan Mir (Lazard), although they are not to be 
blamed for any errors or inaccuracies in our interpretation of their very helpful suggestions. 
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with synergy and the value of the combined firm without synergy provides a value for 
synergy.”203 
 We believe that this approach makes perfect sense from a theoretical standpoint. We 
suggest, however, that applied to real world litigation to determine fair value, it is both 
unrealistic and unnecessary. It is unrealistic because it would require valuing the expected free 
cash flows of not one but three distinct firms, thereby defeating the principal benefit of being 
able to rely on a fixed deal price instead of wildly disparate competing discounted cash flow 
valuations.  This would compound the problems inherent in calculating future values that we 
have discussed above.  In the normal appraisal, there is the calculation of the value of the target 
firm.  Experts can have optimistic or pessimistic stories to tell about the target’s firm future 
value.  In the three-step approach, there are three stories, with different valuation estimates 
hanging on whether the expert is optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the target firm, the 
acquiring firm, and the combined firm with synergies.   
In the context of statutory appraisal litigation the three-step approach is not only 
unrealistic, it is unnecessary as well, because once the first component of the exercise is 
completed, and a DCF value for the target firm as an independent entity has been established, 
there is no occasion (if the analysis is reliable) to continue with the remainder of the exercise.  
Since the target firm is being valued without regard to the effects of the merger, the synergies 
arising from the merger do not need to be estimated and deducted from the value of the firm to 
arrive at fair value.     
A second approach to estimating synergistic merger gains involves an assessment of the 
response of acquirer and target stock (or stock option) prices to announcement of the merger 
                                                
203 Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Synergy, at 6-7 (Oct. 2005), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=841486 (emphasis in original). 
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terms.204 We pass over the details of that approach, however, because it is likely to be available 
in real world appraisal litigation only rarely. The approach requires that the stock of both 
acquirer and target be publicly traded. Market-based information should be used whenever it is 
available, but in the typical appraisal case, in which the stock of either the target or the buyer, or 
both, is not publicly traded, there is insufficient market-based information to use this technique 
to estimate synergies.  Among the forty or so appraisal cases in the last fifteen years that 
generated a valuation opinion, only eleven involved both a publicly traded target and a publicly 
traded buyer. And in the eight of those nine cases that did not involve a freezeout by a 
controlling stockholder205 or a significant conflict of interest on the part of two major 
stockholders,206 the stockholders seeking appraisal fared remarkably badly: the median 
increment of the fair value determination over the deal price was negative 4-8%; the average 
increment was negative 19.4%; the best outcome was a positive increment of 3%; and the worst 
outcome was a negative increment of 85%.207 With such results, it seems most unlikely that 
                                                
204 Kathryn Barraclough, et al., Using Option Prices to Infer Overpayments and Synergies in 
M&A Transactions, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 695 (2013); Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han 
Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their Division Between the 
Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. OF FIN. ECON. 3(1988). 
205 See Appendix (Prescott Group v. Coleman Co. and AT&T Mobility). The Appendix to this 
article lists Delaware appraisal cases since 1997, and recites for each such case the deal price, the 
fair value established by the court, and the percentage difference between those two figures, as 
well as whether the underlying transaction was an “interested transaction” as defined in Model 
Business Corporation Act § 13.01. In recent cases, the fair value judgment of the Court of 
Chancery specified in the Appendix may not be final (i.e., may be subject to appeal or revision 
on remand). 
206 See Appendix (Global GT v. Global Telecom). That case involved a clear conflict of interest 
on the part of the two largest stockholders of the target company (owning over 44% of the stock), 
which also held large blocks (greater in percentage terms and absolute value) of the bidder’s 
stock. Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 503 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff’d, Golden 
Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT, LP, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).  
207 See Appendix: Merion v. 3M Cogent (+3%); Longpath v. Ramtron (-1%); AOL (-3%); 
Andaloro v. PFPC (-4%); SWS (-8%); AXA Financial (-22%), Aruba Networks (-35%) and 
Clearwire (-85%). 
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appraisal arbitrage or other active use of the appraisal remedy will occur in cases of public 
company acquisitions of other public companies, except in cases of freezeouts by a controlling 
stockholder or other transactions that involve conflicted major stockholders. Given that likely 
infrequency, it is doubtful at best that the courts will have much occasion to adopt an approach 
dependent on trading prices of publicly held target and bidder stock. 
 A third approach, and the one we advocate, calls for a direct assessment of the value of 
synergies and is not dependent on public trading of either the target’s or the bidder’s stock. 
Specifically, we suggest an approach in which each element of synergy is framed in terms of 
periodic incremental improvements to future free cash flow, and the resulting stream of 
anticipated incremental cash flows is reduced to present value.208 An illustration of our approach 
may be helpful. Assume that Target (T) and Buyer (B) have accounting staffs of 25 and 75 
persons, respectively, but that after their merger the combined firm will employ an accounting 
staff of only 90 persons. Assume further that the aggregate annual compensation of the 10 
accounting staff members who will no longer be employed is $1 million. Assume further, finally, 
that T and B had anticipated that, but for the merger, those 10 persons would have been 
                                                
208 See Jens Kengelbach, Dennis Utzerath, & Cristoph Kaserer, How Successful M&A Deals Split 
the Synergies, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP (Mar. 27, 2013), available at 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/mergers_acquisitions_postmerger_integration
_divide_conquer_deals_split_synergies/?chapter=2 (“Because synergies tend to mount over time 
and become fully effective after roughly two years (assuming skillful management by the 
acquirer), the value of synergies can be stated as the present value of ongoing synergies after two 
years.”); Kristen Ficery, et al., The Synergy Enigma, available at 
https://www.criticaleye.com/insights-servfile.cfm?id=47 (“Synergies are the present value of the 
net, additional cash flow that is generated by a combination of two companies that could not 
have been generated by either company on its own.”); Fiorentino & Garzella, note [ ] above, 124 
INT’L RES. J. OF FIN. & ECON. at 73 (describing the “net present value model” in which “the 
synergy value is the present value of the expected synergy flows from the deal process, 
discounted back at a rate that reflects the riskiness of these flows.”). According to survey results 
gathered by Fiorentino & Garzella, this model is, by a wide margin, the most frequently used. Id. 
at 77. 
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employed going forward indefinitely. With these assumptions, and putting aside tax 
considerations, one can define the synergy achieved by the merger as a stream of future free cash 
flows of $1 million per year in perpetuity. Applying an appropriate discount rate applicable to 
the combined firm209 (say 10% for illustrative purposes) yields a present value of $10 million. In 
an actual case, the analysis would surely be more complex. The full benefit of synergies may not 
be achieved immediately: in our example, it may take one or two years to achieve the 
contemplated staff reduction. Similarly, the expected synergy may be offset by related costs 
(sometimes described as negative synergies): in our example, again, there may be severance 
payments required to achieve the contemplated staff reductions, and those payments would have 
to be deducted from the anticipated cash flow enhancements.  
 This approach can also be applied to synergies involving revenue enhancements rather 
than cost reductions.210 The analysis would simply examine what revenue enhancements are 
expected, year by year, and would discount the resulting future cash flows to a present value to 
arrive at the synergy contribution of the revenue enhancement under examination. We suspect, 
however, that synergistic revenue enhancements will ordinarily be harder to predict than cost 
synergies and, therefore, less likely than cost synergies to contribute to a discount from deal 
price to arrive at fair value.211 
                                                
209 Note that because it is the combined firm that generates the future cash flows under 
consideration, it is that firm’s cost of capital, and not the cost of capital of the target firm, that 
should be applied in estimating the present values of synergistic gains. 
210 Ficery, et al., The Synergy Enigma, note [] above (one should “define and identify revenue 
synergies as the positive present value of the net cash flows that result from revenue increases.”). 
211 Kengelbach,  et al. (“Revenue synergies, on the other hand, are more difficult both to realize 
and to quantify, depending as they do on the behavior of third parties such as customers. 
Although concepts such as cross-selling, up-selling, and concentrating on the highest-margin 
products and segments are conceptually easy to grasp, realizing them calls for exceptional 
management and execution. As a result, analysts and investors tend to view revenue synergies 
with great skepticism, preferring to believe in them only after they have come to fruition. 
2/26/18  
 62 
 The synergy-specific discounted cash flow approach that we suggest also makes perfect 
theoretical sense. There are two reasons, however, why one could nevertheless question whether 
this alternative approach represents any practical improvement over a full discounted cash flow 
valuation of the subject/target firm.  First, it is unclear whether or to what extent acquirers 
actually engage in the exercise of preparing estimates of synergistic gains in a fashion that might 
be useful to a synergy-specific discounted cash flow analysis. Many acquirers take the occasion, 
upon announcement of a deal, to publicize estimates of gross synergies, but those 
announcements are largely devoid of any period by period breakdowns of anticipated savings 
and related costs.212  
 We nevertheless suspect that acquirers could, in litigation, present such breakdowns – 
after all, the public disclosures of gross synergistic gains are presumably premised on more 
granular estimates of such gains. With renewed attention on the part of the Delaware courts to 
the issue of a deduction for synergies, the parties are now incentivized to prepare this 
information and present it in litigation.  Indeed, we predict that such attention and incentives may 
generate an outpouring of evidence bearing on synergy estimates.  The treatment of synergies in 
finance literature, largely neglected today, may become a prime target of finance-based research.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Acquirers, by the same token, tend to downplay talk of revenue synergies during deal 
negotiations to avoid the risk that the seller will demand a share of synergies that ultimately may 
not materialize.”); Ficery, et al., The Synergy Enigma, note [] above (“Revenue synergies are 
especially controversial, because they are often difficult to calculate and capture, and are also 
often overvalued.”). 
212 See, e.g., “AT&T to Acquire Time Warner,” AT&T Press Release (Oct. 22, 2016), available 
at http://about.att.com/story/att_to_acquire_time_warner.html (“AT&T expects $1 billion in 
annual run rate cost synergies within 3 years of the deal closing. The expected cost synergies are 
primarily driven by corporate and procurement expenditures. In addition, over time, AT&T 
expects to achieve incremental revenue opportunities that neither company could obtain on a 
standalone basis.”); Qualcomm press release, “Qualcomm to Acquire NXP,” (Oct. 27, 2016), 
available at https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2016/10/27/qualcomm-acquire-nxp 
(“Qualcomm expects to generate $500 million of annualized run-rate cost synergies within two 
years after the transaction closes.”). 
2/26/18  
 63 
We note that appraisal litigants only started using sophisticated DCF-based analyses after 
Weinberger required that the best techniques of finance be used to support appraisal awards.213  
Similarly, the use of fairness opinions from investment bankers became a typical part of deal 
documents only after Smith v. Van Gorkom implied that such documents might be useful for 
directors in fulfilling their fiduciary duties.214 
 A second reason for questioning the synergy-specific DCF analysis we advocate, 
however, is that it uses many of the same highly contestable inputs (e.g., beta, equity risk 
premium) that are employed in a target firm-only discounted cash flow valuation. Our response 
is simply that in evaluating anticipated synergistic gains, as opposed to whole-firm cash flows, 
one is likely to be applying the contestable inputs to a much smaller amount of future cash flows 
than the cash flows associated with the target firm as a whole. As a result, the same variability of 
inputs should have a smaller cumulative effect on valuation contentions, where only the value of 
synergies is contested.   The small effect is only a partial consolation, especially since the 
optimism or pessimism of the competing expert stories may make the percentage effect even 
larger, particularly if and when the serious subtraction of synergies enters case law.  
  2. Estimating the Allocation of Synergies to the Target 
 Even if the total present value of synergies expected to arise from the merger could be 
estimated with great confidence, it could not necessarily be deducted in full from the deal price 
to arrive at the fair value of the target firm; to do so inflexibly would in effect assume that none 
of that synergy value is retained by the acquiring firm. Thus, for example, if the acquiring firm 
anticipated $10 million in anticipated synergies and shared $4 million of that value with target 
                                                
213 457 A.2d at 713. 
214 Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Jacob J. Fedechko, The Role of Judicial Opinions in Shaping 
M&A Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (Edward Elgar 2016), 
at [ ]. 
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stockholders by including that amount in the deal price, that $4 million should be deducted from 
the deal price in arriving at fair value. The question in any given appraisal proceeding, then, is to 
determine the extent to which estimated synergies were allocated in the deal to target 
stockholders and how much of that value was retained by the acquirer.  
 To say that the answer to this question is less than scientifically precise would be a 
considerable understatement. To the best of our knowledge, the percentage allocation in any 
given deal is not expressly articulated in the merger agreement or even in merger negotiations.215 
The relatively sparse literature on this question, moreover, is inconsistent. Some advance the 
view that synergistic merger gains almost exclusively benefit target shareholders, and acquiring 
firms retain none of those gains.216 According to another study, which relied on post-deal 
announcement call option price movements rather than stock price movements, acquirers and 
target shareholders share such gains about equally.217 A more recent and detailed study reports 
that the median percentage of synergy value received by target shareholders is 31%, although the 
allocation varies by industry, with target shareholders in the telecommunications industry 
                                                
215 The court in Aruba Networks acknowledged this measurement problem: “The parties agree 
that it is not possible to determine with precision what portion of the final deal price reflects 
synergy value. The respondent’s expert conceded that ‘[t]he percentage of synergies actually 
paid by HP to Aruba cannot be accurately measured.’”). Id., slip op. at 102. 
216 S.B. Moeller, F.P. Schlingemann & R.M. Stultz, Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A 
Study of Acquiring Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 60 J. FIN. 757 (2004) (estimating 
that acquiring firm stockholders lose 12 cents per acquisition dollar spent, indicating that on 
average any merger synergy value (and more) is allocated to target stockholders); Michael 
Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate Acquisitions and their 
Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. OF FIN. ECON. 3, 31 
(1988) (“target stockholders have captured the lion’s share of the [synergistic] gains from tender 
offers, and their share of these gains has increased since the passage of the Williams Amendment 
of 1968.”). 
217 Kathryn Barraclough, et al., Using Option Prices to Infer Overpayments and Synergies in 
M&A Transactions, 26 The Review of Financial Studies [] (2013). 
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receiving 6% of synergy value and target shareholders in the health care industry receiving 51% 
of synergy value.218 
 Other commentators indicate that the allocation of synergy gains in mergers may be 
determined by factors in addition to industry type. For example, it has been suggested, plausibly, 
that such gains are likely to be more fully shared with target stockholders as the number of 
bidders and intensity of bidding competition increase.219 It has also been suggested that the 
target’s shareholders will receive a greater share of synergistic merger gains if the target firm’s 
contribution to those synergies is greater.220 In our analysis, however, a finding that a target firm 
is entirely or largely responsible for the creation of a synergistic gain may well also lead to the 
conclusion that the gain was an opportunity belonging to the target and, thus, part of its going 
concern value.221 That conclusion in turn would dictate that in using deal price to determine fair 
value, no deduction should be made on account of that gain.  
   3. Judicial Evaluation of Synergy Claims 
 As reviewed above, judicial evaluation of synergy claims is in its infancy, and pertinent 
authorities and financial expertise have yet to develop fully. One can imagine a more mature 
                                                
218 Jens Kengelbach, Dennis Utzerath, & Cristoph Kaserer, How Successful M&A Deals Split the 
Synergies, BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP (Mar. 27, 2013), available at 
https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/mergers_acquisitions_postmerger_integration
_divide_conquer_deals_split_synergies/#chapter1. This study is as detailed in its conclusions as 
it is lacking in transparency: the report does not reveal its methodology, and the data base is 
described only as “636 deals with transaction values of over $300 from 2000 to 2011,” without 
specification of industry or jurisdiction.  
219 Bradley, et al., at 31; Kengelbach, et al. (“The amount of the seller’s share does not correlate 
with M&A cycles—that is, it doesn’t rise during M&A-intensive periods and decline during lulls 
in the cycle. It varies instead according to factors such as the relative negotiating strengths of the 
buyer and seller and the amount of competition to acquire the target.”). 
 
221 See part III.B above, addressing how to identify synergies that are appropriately considered in 
arriving at a deduction from deal price to determine fair value. 
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system for such evaluation, however, applying principles already developed in appraisal 
litigation: 
• Just as expert testimony on discounted cash flow analysis has been widely presented and 
accepted as a tool for valuation of firms in appraisal litigation, one can expect that 
synergy valuation will be an appropriate subject for expert testimony, at least where the 
proffered valuation techniques are reasonably familiar to the financial community.222 
• Just as cash flow projections are more readily accepted where they are prepared by 
management in the ordinary course of business, and not strictly for purposes of 
litigation,223 synergy projections are likely to be more persuasive where they are 
generated as part of a merger integration planning process, where there is at least some 
incentive for presenting estimates that are sustainable, rather than purely for litigation 
purposes. Unmoored from the operational integration planning process, synergy estimates 
may be subject to upward bias on account of an interest on the part of the acquirer in 
persuading the market (including its own investors) that the acquisition is beneficial.224  
                                                
222 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (endorsing the use of “generally 
accepted [valuation] techniques used in the financial community and the courts”). Referring to 
the context of appraisal in connection with controller freeze-outs, Coates expressed a similar 
hope that financial and litigation practice would develop techniques for assessing synergies. 
Coates, note [ ] above, 147 U. PA. L. REV. at 1352 (“Practitioners would develop and refine 
techniques for arriving at appropriate adjustments, and a body of case law would develop to 
assist practitioners in this process.”). 
223 See, e.g., ACP Master, Ltd. v. Clearwire Corp., 2017 WL 3105858, at *31 (Del. Ch. July 21, 
2017) (“The first key to a reliable DCF analysis is the availability of reliable projections of future 
expected cash flows, preferably derived from contemporaneous management projections 
prepared in the ordinary course of business.”) (quoting In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, 
at *32 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017)). 
224 See Peter Welsh, et al., Management Projections in Delaware Appraisal Litigation: 
Anecdotal Evidence, note [] above, at 17 (“Existing literature suggests that management’s 
financial forecasts often exhibit upward biases.”, citing David S. Koo & P. Eric Yeung, 
Managers’ Forecasts of Long-Term Growth in Earnings: New Information or Cheap Talk? at 3 
(Working Paper) available at 
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• Because it would be the acquirer (as or through the surviving corporation) that would be 
urging a deduction from deal price to account for synergies, and because it is the acquirer 
that should be expected to have, or have access to, evidence of the extent and allocation 
of such synergies, any significant weakness in the evidence should, to the extent of such 
weakness, result in a refusal by the court to give effect to the requested discount from 
deal price.225 Put another way, where acquirers are aware of the potential for appraisal 
litigation in which the target’s share of synergies is to be deducted from the deal price in 
measuring fair value, a failure on their part to generate reasonably supported specific 
synergy estimates in the course of merger planning should counsel against accepting 
claims for a deduction from deal price based on estimates of synergies generated solely 
for purposes of litigation. 
• As suggested in one recent case, the court’s choice of estimate of how synergies were 
shared may be guided by its judgment about the quality of the bargaining by the target’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/Eric%20Yeung.pdf, and 
Christopher S. Armstrong, et. al., Biases in multi-year management financial forecasts: Evidence 
from private venture-backed U.S. companies, 12 REV. OF ACCOUNTING STUDIES 183 (2007)). 
225 E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 878 (Del. 1985) (“the production of weak evidence 
when strong is, or should have been, available can lead only to the conclusion that the strong 
would have been adverse.”); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) 
(“The production of weak evidence when strong is available can lead only to the conclusion that 
the strong would have been adverse.”). Where a controller stockholder is relying on evidence 
from comparable transactions and contending for a deduction from deal prices based on 
synergies, burdens of proof associated with the entire fairness doctrine provide a further basis for 
rejecting such deductions where the evidence for such deductions is weak or non-existent. See 
Montgomery Cellular Holding Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 221-222 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“Given 
the paucity of synergy-related evidence for which [the controlling stockholder] was responsible, 
the Vice Chancellor coped admirably with the evidence that was presented, and reached a 
reasonable valuation using the analytical tools and evidence that were available to him.”). See 
also Coates, note [] above, 147 U. PA. L. REV. at 1352 (asserting that “traditional Delaware law 
in entire fairness litigation that places the burden of proving entire fairness on the transaction 
sponsors … would permit control persons, at a minimum, to exclude the impact of synergy value 
if they could propose a reliable estimate of such synergies.”). 
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representatives: a perception that bargaining was relatively weak may imply that the 
target’s stockholders received a relatively smaller share of overall synergies, and vice 
versa.226 
• Finally, the courts would likely be assisted in their evaluation of synergies by continued 
use of discounted cash flow valuation of the standalone target firm. In theory, that 
valuation should yield a result equal to the difference between the deal price and the 
value of synergies shared with target stockholders. Accordingly, where the latter formula 
is used to determine fair value (where the deal process is adequate), DCF analysis may be 
a check on the plausibility of contentions about the extent of synergies being deducted 
from the deal price, and the efficacy of the deal process.227 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 In the wake of judicial decisions emphasizing reliance on the deal price to determine fair 
value, it remains to be seen whether appraisal arbitrage will continue to be as rewarding and as 
common a practice as it has been in recent years. But we see no reason why the legal validity of 
the practice will or should be eliminated, and we believe that it should remain as a mechanism to 
make the appraisal remedy viable where the remedy can serve as a check on self-serving 
opportunism or even a disinterested failure to conduct a reasonable sale process. 
                                                
226 Aruba Networks, slip op. at 104-105 (“Because I am inclined to think that Aruba’s 
representatives bargained less effectively than they might have, I tend to think that they obtained 
a relatively low share of the synergies from HP.”). 
227 In several instances the courts have found a DCF analysis helpful in corroborating their 
reliance on the deal price in determining fair value. E.g., Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 189, at *89 (“The proximity between th[e] outcome [of the court’s DCF analysis] and the 
result of the sale process is comforting.”); Ancestry.com, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, at *23 (the 
fact that DCF analysis yielded a value reasonably close to the deal price gave the court “comfort 
that no undetected factor skewed the sales process”). 
2/26/18  
 69 
 On the other hand, we concur with the legal premise, articulated by the Delaware 
Supreme Court in DFC and Dell, that fair value in appraisal proceedings should not be found to 
exceed the result of a sale process that is disinterested and reasonable. We further submit that the 
Delaware courts have developed and applied a standard that can appropriately be used to 
determine when a sale process has been reasonable: namely, the standard of enhanced scrutiny, 
for reasonableness, as formulated and used in the courts’ Revlon jurisprudence.228 Application of 
that standard would avoid concerns that a presumption in favor of using the deal price to 
establish fair value (a “market price rule”) would eliminate bidders’ incentives to pay 
appropriately high prices: a bidder seeking to take advantage of a conflicted or inadequate sale 
process would not be able to presume that its exposure in appraisal litigation would be limited to 
the deal price (plus prejudgment interest); to the contrary, the bidder (the real party in interest in 
appraisal litigation) would be required to bear the initial burden of establishing that the sale 
process was unconflicted and fell within at least a range of reasonableness. That approach, 
coupled with a viable prospect of appraisal arbitrage, would give bidders for public companies 
an incentive to avoid demands for unreasonably accelerated bidding deadlines or unusually 
stringent deal protections, at least without being satisfied that the target company has engaged in 
a robust pre-signing market check. 
                                                
228 Absent faithful implementation of the special committee and majority of the minority vote 
protections specified in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014), that 
standard would certainly not apply in the case of a freezeout merger effected by a controlling 
stockholder. In that situation, therefore, we would not expect the court to rely on the merger 
price to measure fair value. Although the court in that situation might take into account the price 
that might be achieved in a hypothetical sale to a third party (Cornfields, note [ ] above, 31 J. 
CORP. L. at 151-152), that hypothetical price lacks the legitimizing imprimatur of actual market 
behavior, and would presumably not be entitled to the sort of deference contemplated by the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s recent opinions in DFC and Dell. 
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 If the Delaware courts continue to rely on the deal price to measure fair value in 
appropriate cases, they will increasingly be required to implement the settled legal mandate that 
merger gains that are solely attributable to the merger and that are included in the deal price must 
be deducted from that price in order to arrive at fair value. The case law and the finance literature 
addressing how such a deduction should be determined are sparse. Our intuition is that the craft 
of responsibly estimating such a deduction – by estimating overall merger gains and estimating 
how much of them are shared with target stockholders through the deal price – will become more 
refined, just as the courts’ treatment of discounted cash flow analysis became more refined with 
experience after its initial acceptance in Weinberger v. UOP. We expect in this regard that 
bidders will develop more detailed evidence of anticipated synergies, and that if they do so in the 
context of evaluating their bids and preparing to implement post-merger business plans, the 
courts will be more inclined to accept such evidence than would be the case with synergy 
estimates prepared solely for litigation purposes.  
 Even with these refinements of the appraisal remedy, the courts’ well-developed 
familiarity with the ins and outs of discounted cash flow analysis will not become obsolete. Most 
obviously, that valuation technique will continue to be the primary guide to determining fair 
value in cases in which the deal price cannot be relied upon.229 And even in cases where the deal 
price can be advocated as the appropriate valuation determinant, courts are likely to continue to 
be guided by discounted cash flow valuations, if only to help evaluate the plausibility of 
contentions that the deal process was reasonable and that proposed synergy deductions are 
appropriate.  
                                                
229 This is precisely the approach adopted by the Court of Chancery in its recent opinion in AOL. 
Id., slip op. at 24 (where deal price was found to be insufficiently reliable to measure fair value, 
“a discounted cash flow analysis is the best way to value the Company.”). 
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APPENDIX* 
 Case    Year  Conflict? Deal Price Fair Value % diff. 
Straight Arrow Publishers 1998 No  $100.00   $262.96  97% 
Allenson v. Midway Airlines 2001 No  $0.01   $0.01  0% 
Cytokine Pharmasciences 2002 Yes       N/A  $1,114 
                   
N/A 
Union Financial Group 2003 No  $8.74   $8.74  0% 
American Specialty Retailing 2003 No  $2,200.00   $9,079.43  142% 
Montgomery Cellular Holding  2004 Yes $8,102.23   $19,621.74  88% 
MedPointe Healthcare, Inc. 2004 No  $20.44   $24.45  18% 
 JRC Acquisition Corp. 2004 Yes  $13.00   $13.58  4% 
Emerging Communications  2004 Yes  $10.25   $44.95  148% 
Cancer Treatment Centers  2004 Yes  $260.00   $1,345.00  164% 
Coleman Co., Inc. 2004 Yes  $9.31   $32.35  125% 
Gholl v. eMachines 2004 Yes  $1.06   $1.64  44% 
US Cellular (Janesville) 2005 Yes  $43.85   $54.00  21% 
US Cellular (Sheboygan) 2005 Yes  $21.45   $30.13  34% 
Andaloro v. PFPC 2005 Yes  $34.26   $32.81  -4% 
In re PNB Holding Co. 2006 No  $41.00   $52.34  24% 
Gesoff v. IIC Industries 2006 Yes  $10.50   $14.30  31% 
Delaware Open MRI v. Kessler 2006 Yes  $16,228.55   $33,232.26  72% 
Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. 2007 No  $25.00   $32.31  26% 
AXA Financial 2007 No  $31.00   $24.97  -22% 
In re Appraisal of Metromedia 2009 No  $9.52   $38.92  141% 
Hanover Direct 2010 No  $0.25   $0.25  0% 
Global GT v. Golden Telecom 2010 Yes  $105.00   $125.49  18% 
Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc. 2012 No  $40,000,000   $34,244,576 -16% 
In re Orchard Enterprises 2012 Yes  $2.05   $4.67  82% 
American Commercial Lines 2013 No  $33.00   $38.16  15% 
Merion Capital v. 3M Cogent 2013 No  $10.50   $10.87  3% 
Huff Fund v. CKx. 2013 No  $5.50   $5.50  0% 
Towerview LLC v. Cox Radio 2013 Yes  $4.80   $5.75  18% 
3M Cogent 2013 No  $10.50   $10.87  3% 
Laidler v. Hesco 2014 Yes  $207.50   $364.24  56% 
Ancestry  2015 No  $32.00   $32.00  0% 
LongPath Capital v. Ramtron 2015 No  $3.10   $3.07  -1% 
Merlin Partners LP v. Autoinfo 2015 No  $1.05   $1.05  0% 
Merion Capital v. BMC 2015 No  $46.25   $46.25  0% 
Owen v. Cannon 2015 Yes  $19.95   $31.94  47% 
AutoInfo 2015 No  $1.05   $1.05  0% 
DFC Global Corp 2016 No  $9.50   $10.21  7% 
Dell 2016 Yes  $13.75   $17.62  25% 
Dunmire v. F&M 2016 Yes  $83.00   $91.90  10% 
Lender Processing 2016 No  $37.14   $37.14  0% 
2/26/18  
 73 
In re Petsmart 2017 No  $83.00   $83.00  0% 
In re SWS Group 2017 No  $6.92   $6.38  -8% 
Clearwire  2017 Yes  $5.00   $2.13  -85% 
Aruba Networks 2018 No  $24.37   $17.12  -35% 
AOL 2018 No $50.00 $48.70 -3% 
 
__________________ 
* This Appendix lists Delaware appraisal cases since 1997, and recites for each such case the 
deal price, the fair value established by the court, and the percentage difference between those 
two figures (specifically, the log of the court’s fair value determination minus the log of the deal 
price). The entry under the heading “Conflict?” denotes whether the underlying transaction was 
an “interested transaction” as defined in Model Business Corporation Act § 13.01. In recent 
cases (Dell, for example), the fair value judgment of the Court of Chancery specified in this 
Appendix may not be final (i.e., may be subject to appeal or revision on remand). 
